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ABSTRACT
The sharing economy is a socio-economic ecosystem built around the sharing of
human and physical resources. This is considered to be a new and alternate socio-
economic system which is currently in its early stages and has tremendous potential.
The sharing economy combines the need to direct demand towards supply by adding
the point of view of collaboration based on the social networks and preferences of
various entities involved. This is based on the economic model of Collaborative
Consumption in which participants share access to resources rather than having
individual ownership over them.
We propose the novel idea of a sharing economy-based model for knowledge sharing
amongst peers in a classroom setting. Students often find themselves stuck on trivial
implementation details like syntax, best practices and which tools to use. Many
times, help is difficult to find, even though the solution might be known to one of the
student’s peers. Moreover, many large classes do not have enough teaching assistants
to help out students and the use of such a platform can be useful to oﬄoad simple
questions within the classroom itself, saving office hours for more complex questions.
This, coupled with the benefits of a collaborative learning environment for students,
has motivated us towards the development of an on-demand peer-to-peer tutoring
and knowledge sharing platform.
Such a platform can also help us understand how different incentive mechanisms
motivate people to share knowledge: Are people motivated by social reputation or
money? We develop an Android application called “Quet” which can be used by
students to request help from their peers for questions related to their coursework
on-demand. Preliminary observations show that an application like Quet is useful;
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and we wish to deploy this in multiple courses in subsequent semesters to realize its
full potential and utility to students and instructors alike.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there are many applications of the sharing economy model for providing
and distributing services among consumers. Most of these applications are exam-
ples of Commercial Peer-to-Peer Mutualization Systems (CPMS) which provide a
web-based platform to match demand and supply. Users on these applications gen-
erally provide services on a peer-to-peer basis, which means that the same set of
users are service providers in some cases and consumers in other cases. Uber [44],
Airbnb [1] and TaskRabbit [42] are examples of popularly used services based on the
sharing economy model. Section 1.2 describes and compares various sharing econ-
omy startups. Though most sharing economy-based products are based on users
exchanging services and resources that are physically quantifiable, the same model
can be extended to knowledge sharing.
In large classrooms, students are often unable to get help from instructors due to
insufficient office hours. Moreover, due to a large number of students, office hours are
often consumed by simple and repetitive questions which students can easily solve
amongst themselves in a peer-learning environment. A lot of times, students find
themselves stuck on trivial implementation details, which may not even be directly
related to the concepts taught in the course. Finding professional tutors is often
too expensive for students and does not make sense for trivial issues. Time wasted
searching the web can be better utilized in learning more complicated aspects of the
course. In such a classroom setting, students can benefit from knowledge sharing
and peer-to-peer studying to a great extent. Getting on-demand help and learning
from peers can be very useful in such a scenario. Not only does such a service
allow students to receive help from their peers on-demand, but it also helps promote
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collaboration amongst peers and provides students opportunities to learn by teaching.
One of the critical challenges in designing such an application for on-demand tu-
toring and knowledge sharing, is promoting participation. Chapter 2 goes over the
research in the field of designing incentive mechanisms on such resource sharing
networks. A lot of work has been done in promoting participation on peer-to-peer
content delivery and online information sharing networks. Most of this work has
dealt with using social reputation or money to incentivize participation. Another
interesting problem is how to match supply and demand in the context of a sharing
economy service. Finding matches that are beneficial for both the producer and
consumer of the service is of utmost importance.
In this thesis we have developed an Android application called “Quet” for on-
demand peer-to-peer tutoring to solve the above-mentioned problems. In order to
tackle the challenges mentioned previously, we have aimed at incorporating an in-
centive mechanism within Quet, which motivates students to participate as much as
possible, while increasing their personal profit. Another interesting problem that we
have aimed at addressing, is how students requesting help on Quet are matched with
the best available peer. Quet takes into account both peer’s preferences and finds
the best available match so as to satisfy these preferences as much as possible.
1.1 Motivation
In this section, we present the motivation behind our research on a sharing economy-
based on-demand peer-to-peer tutoring and resource sharing application. We present
the research questions that we have attempted to tackle and the motivation behind
the design of Quet.
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1.1.1 Research Questions
Our research is aimed at answering 2 main questions:
1. How do different incentive models motivate people to share knowledge in a
peer-to-peer on-demand setting?
2. How useful is an application like Quet in solving problems faced by students
in a classroom setting? Can using an application like Quet motivate students
to collaborate more with their peers? Can it improve their performance in the
classroom?
By applying our study of on-demand peer-to-peer resource sharing in the context
of tutoring and knowledge sharing for a classroom setting, we were able to try to
address a multitude of problems faced by students and instructors. Finding a solution
to these problems was the main motivation for developing Quet.
1.1.2 Problems Addressed through Quet
Some of the major problems we have aimed to address while designing Quet are as
follows:
• Poor student-instructor ratio: Traditional classrooms are often faced with the
problem of an imbalance in the number of enrolled students to the number of
available teaching assistants and instructors. This in turn leads to dissatisfied
students unable to get help when required, and overworked course staff. Quet
attempts to solve this problem by allowing students to request help on-demand,
without having to wait for office hours, thus reducing the pressure on course
staff and also improving the student’s learning experience.
• Ineffective office hours: To add to the above-mentioned problem of already in-
sufficient office hours, office hours are also often taken up by problems that can
be easily solved by students in peer-to-peer learning groups. Simple questions
related to implementation details, such as which resources and tools to use,
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syntax-related questions, etc. often take up office hours without actually offer-
ing much help to students. Quet aims at solving this problem by encouraging
students to ask questions like these, via the app to their peers. By oﬄoading
simple questions amongst peers in the classroom, we hope to see an improve-
ment in the quality of office hours by allowing the course staff to focus on more
important and difficult questions.
• Online help often isn’t on-demand: Online forums and websites like Piazza [32]
are often not on-demand given the number of questions posted by students on
these platforms. This is again due to a poor student-instructor ratio. More-
over, many posts are repetitive and instructors waste time redirecting questions
towards earlier posts. Quet attempts to solve this problem by matching help-
requesters up with peers on-demand.
• Difficulty expressing questions: Students often find it difficult to express their
questions in a written form on online forums like Piazza. Moreover, a lot of
students also avoid asking questions in class due to fear of embarrassment. It
is often easier for students to express such questions in-person using an appli-
cation like Quet. This also allows for follow-up discussion on these problems.
• Difficulty finding help: Even if students decide to ask for help amongst their
peers, it is often difficult to find a peer that can offer help. Knowledge is hidden
amongst a student’s peers in a classroom, so it becomes increasingly important
(and difficult) to connect a student with an apt peer who is capable of helping
the student. Quet simplifies this process by providing students with the ability
to simply request help, without worrying about finding a mentor on their own.
• Tutors are expensive: Professional tutors are expensive. The main usage of
Quet is aimed to be towards simple problems that students find themselves
struggling with in their coursework. These problems are generally very specific
and not necessarily conceptual questions that require the expertise of a tutor
or instructor. Given the nature of these problems, it does not make sense to
spend a large amount on tutors. Quet allows users to ask for help from their
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peers at a minimal cost (equivalent to about the cost of a coffee). After all, a
student receiving help from his or her peers would offer them a cup of coffee
anyhow. The added advantage of this model is that tutoring becomes more
informal and friendly.
• Time is wasted searching the web: Students often waste time searching the web
for problems they encounter in their coursework. Many times, they may not
even be able to express their problem in the form of a search query. This not
only wastes time, but can be frustrating. Even if a student is able to express
his or her search query correctly, it is likely that they will not receive the best
possible answer catered to their needs by searching on the web. If the student
was to ask his or her peer instead, it is more likely that the peer understands
their question better given the context of their common courses. Not only does
this save the student’s time wasted on web searching, but personal interaction
also often makes problem solving easier. Quet aims at leveraging these bene-
fits of personal interaction and contextual similarity between peers to match
students up with those peers who would be able to solve their questions to the
best of their abilities.
• No sense of community within peers: Individual study often leads to a lack of
a sense of community amongst peers. Many works of research such as Boud
et al. [5] and Topping [43] emphasize the importance of peer learning and how
it has shown to improve student performance to a great extent. Quet implicitly
aims at inculcating and strengthening this sense of community amongst peers
as well.
• Lack of exposure to teaching: Students often do not get the opportunity to
teach. By introducing an application like Quet, students are able to benefit
from this opportunity. Furthermore, by allowing students to mentor their peers,
it forces them to solidify their understanding of the course material. Quet
hopes to improve student performance through this philosophy of “learning by
teaching”.
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• Lack of incentives to help peers: In the current classroom setting, there is barely
any motivation for students to help their peers. Quet introduces incentives in
the form of both money as well as quantifiable social reputation. Students
willing to offer help altruistically, are allowed to do so and are in fact more
likely to be matched with help-requesters. Quet aims to motivate students to
share knowledge by helping their peers via this incentive mechanism.
1.2 Brief Overview of Sharing Economy-Based Products
In order to understand how resource-sharing should be tackled while designing Quet,
it is important to understand similar sharing economy-based applications. In this
section we present a brief overview of existing products and startups that are based
on a collaborative consumption, or sharing economy model. We analyze the kinds
of resources that these different startups share, as well as the nature of the resource
sharing. This overview will help us understand the extent to which sharing econ-
omy models can help solve daily problems and also how they differ in the incentive
mechanisms used.
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Company
Name
Resource
Shared
On-
Demand/
Planned
Description
Uber/Lyft/Ola Time, Car On-
Demand
Car owner gives rides to
users on-demand. The car
owner may or may not be
spending time (depending
on whether the person to
pick up wants to go along
their original route or not),
but the car owner uses his
or her own car.
Airbnb Time,
Rooms
Planned House owners lease parts of
their house or their entire
house to the consumer. The
host spends some time on
cleaning their house, pro-
viding facilities to their ten-
ants, etc.
JustPark Space Planned,
On-
demand
Users rent out their park-
ing spaces to others based
on predefined demands.
Table 1.1: An Overview of Startups using the Sharing Economy Model.
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Instacart Time, Car Planned A grocery-delivery service
where customers get their
groceries delivered to them.
Now Instacart even has in-
dependent contractors who
pick up groceries and deliver
them to customers.
Vinted Clothing On-
demand
Allows users to sell or swap
secondhand clothing. If
swapped, the company gets
no profit. If sold, it gets
some percentage.
Spinlister Bicycles,
skiing
equipment,
etc.
Planned Allows users to rent bicycles
or skiing equipment from
other users.
LeftoverSwap Food Planned An application to share left-
over food with your neigh-
bors.
RelayRides Car Planned Connects users who want to
rent cars inexpensively, to
users who are willing to rent
out their cars.
Dogvacay Time Planned Allows users to find people
willing to take care of their
dogs while they are away on
vacation.
Table 1.1 (cont.)
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Streetbank Things,
Time
On-
demand
Allows users to rent things
from their neighbors who
are willing to share. Neigh-
bors can share ‘skills’ as well
i.e. provide help for tasks
like do-it-yourself things,
gardening, etc. The appli-
cation process is indicative
of the fact that the focus is
more on sharing things and
not time.
TaskRabbit Time On-
demand,
Planned
Users post tasks that they
want to get done (can be
anything from getting coffee
delivered, to groceries, to
filing tax returns). Volun-
teers choose whichever tasks
they are willing to do and
share their time to do the
user’s tasks. Users can even
ask for virtual task comple-
tion (help coding up their
websites, help in research
projects, etc.)
Etsy Things,
Time
On-
demand,
Planned
Allows users to buy and sell
handmade or vintage items.
Table 1.1 (cont.)
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Skillshare Time On-
demand
Allows users to learn about
varied topics via video lec-
tures made by contributors
who go through a training
program related to the skill
they claim to have.
Vayable Time On-
demand
Users offer their time to act
as tourist guides/local ex-
perts for customers who are
on vacation in their areas.
LendingClub Money On-
demand
Allows users to lend money
to others.
Fon Home Wi-
Fi Network
On-
demand
Allow other users to use
your home Wi-Fi network in
exchange for getting to use
any of Fon’s 8 million world-
wide hotspots.
Table 1.1 (cont.)
VentureBeat [45] talks about sharing economy startups that belong to the Unicorn
startup club. This article also evaluates startups based on the kinds of resources
that are being shared. Accordingly, the author divides sharing economy startups as
sharing resources in the following areas:
Learning, Municipal, Money, Goods, Health, Space/Housing, Food, Utilities, Trans-
port, Services, Logistics and Corporate.
We focus our attention to a sharing economy model wherein the resource that is
collaboratively consumed is time and knowledge, in exchange for either money or
social reputation. As part of this thesis, we develop Quet, which is an application for
providing on-demand tutoring and help in a peer-to-peer classroom context. This
sharing economy-based collaborative consumption application makes use of time as
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the shared resource. Peer mentors are expected to also provide their skills to teach
their matched mentee. The nature of the service provided requires it to be planned,
but the service should be relatively on-demand, though not as much as in Uber,
since there is a matching phase between prospective mentors and the mentees/help-
requesters.
1.3 Contributions
We describe the contributions of this study as follows:
• We propose a novel application of the sharing economy-based model in the
context of knowledge sharing. This kind of collaborative consumption service
for knowledge sharing is especially interesting when applied in the context of
education. A large part of this study focuses on solving problems faced by
students in finding necessary help with their coursework in a novel manner.
• We make use of a combination of incentive mechanisms which rewards users
for their participation not only through hard incentives like money, but also
through soft incentives like social reputation. This combination of incentive
models is useful for motivating different kinds of users. Making use of such a
combination of incentives is useful in attracting users motivated by altruistic
contributions, as well as those motivated solely by earning money.
• We propose an interesting approach to match users requesting help to those
capable of providing help. Gale and Shapley [18] devised the Gale-Shapley al-
gorithm for solving the Stable Marriage Problem. The Gale-Shapley algorithm
is used for finding stable matches between two equally sized sets of elements,
wherein each element provides a preference list of elements from the other set.
A variant of the Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem is used for matching
students requesting help to available peers. This variant takes into account
unequal sets, incomplete element preference lists and infeasible candidates for
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each element. Preference lists are generated for students based on various fac-
tors which take into account the ratings and preferences of matched mentor
peers as well as matched mentee peers.
• We create Quet - an Android application for on-demand peer-to-peer tutoring
which makes use of the proposed incentive models, matching algorithm and
the idea of knowledge sharing in a classroom setting. Quet is developed with
a robust infrastructure and backend capable of sustaining a large number of
users. It has been designed keeping in mind the scalability of the problem and
user-base; and encompasses all of the necessary features for users to be able
to request help on-demand to their peers and also provide help on-demand to
matched peers. Although Quet has been designed keeping in mind the scope
of a classroom (and the necessity for an on-demand tutoring service), it has
the potential to be extended to various domains where knowledge sharing (and
resource sharing in general) within social networks is the focus.
In order to design an effective and useful application, we had kept in mind several
possible problems that we could have encountered when designing Quet. The analysis
of these problem areas is highly correlated with the analysis of different sharing
economy-based startups provided in section 1.2.
1.3.1 Pitfalls Avoided while Designing Quet
There were many pitfalls which we had to avoid while designing Quet in order to
successfully tackle the problems we wished to address. Some of these pitfalls have
been described below.
• Authorizing users: Quet has been designed to be deployed at courses within
UIUC. The app ensures that only users who provide their consent to use the
app are allowed to log in. Authorization emails and other authentication checks
are made to ensure that users are enrolled students at UIUC.
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• Ensuring quality help from matched mentors: Due to the informal nature of the
matches and the low costs of providing help, it becomes important to match
students with peers who provide quality help. Quet has been designed so
that students and mentors rate each other after a help-request session. These
ratings, though anonymous to the users, are used internally by Quet’s matching
algorithm in order to reduce the probability of users being matched to low-rated
peers. Thus, users being matched with unsatisfactory peers can give them a low
rating, which would prevent those peers from being matched up as frequently
in the future.
• Matching demand and supply : Since students will presumably use this appli-
cation during their crunch times (before exams, etc.), the matching of mentee
to mentor has to be done rapidly and very accurately so that a student does
not end up wasting his or her time. To tackle this, Quet matches students
with available mentors relatively on-demand, so that students do not have to
wait too long to get matched. The matching also takes into account the prefer-
ences of the help-requester and the matched mentor to make the best possible
matches.
• Infrastructure scalability issues : The infrastructure for this application would
have to be robust to service multiple people at once. We go over the archi-
tecture of Quet in section 3.5. Quet has been designed to be scalable and to
serve multiple simultaneous help-requests asynchronously. This allows for low
latency in application usage as we have described in chapter 4.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we describe the related
work. In chapter 3, we describe Quet in terms of its basic working, incentive model,
the matching algorithm, as well as its underlying architecture. In this chapter, we also
provide a demo working of the application. Chapter 4 talks about the experimental
13
setup and performance metrics related to the usage of Quet. Finally, we conclude
the thesis in chapter 5, in which we also describe how Quet is different from existing
products that offer similar services in the realm of on-demand tutoring.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter we present a survey of research on resource sharing in social networks,
different incentive models and the Stable Marriage Problem. The research presented
in this thesis draws its implementation and ideas from a combination of these three
topics.
2.1 Resource Sharing in Social Networks
Yang and Chen [47] explore the applications of a social network-based collabora-
tion to help people find relevant content and knowledgeable collaborators. Their
work deals with the dissemination of knowledge in a social network and the effect
and extent to which people are able to share this knowledge and information. The
authors conclude that using a social network-based system to support interactive
collaboration between peers in a virtual community can further the extent to which
knowledge can be disseminated amongst peers. Though they do not address the
problems of resource sharing in general, the idea of modeling interactions via social
network analysis is interesting.
Bardhi and Eckhardt [4] talk about emerging trends among people to prefer using
resources on a temporary lease-basis, rather than owning the resource. The authors
provide a case study for Zipcar [48] for a specific car sharing access based consump-
tion model. They study this market where no transfer of ownership takes place and
only time consumption and a minimal service charge are resources that are used.
The authors find that the current trend of access-based consumption is based on
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collaboration between users augmented by social networks and common interests.
The authors note that there has been a shift in the sociocultural politics of resource
consumption and the concept of a sharing economy is becoming more prevalent. The
authors also talk about how this trend is characteristic of short-term resource sharing
as compared to long-term car leasing/renting. This leads to higher profit margins for
the car owner over a period of time and also keeps their sense of ownership towards
the car intact. The current trust-based resource sharing companies sacrifice user
anonymity and privacy to some extent since potential customers can get information
about their host through connected social networking sites and past reviews. The
car sharing example addressed by the authors deals with consumers using cars owned
by a company (such as Zipcar) rather than carpooling startups, but the basic eco-
nomic analysis provided can be applied to any sharing economy-based product. In
conclusion, the authors formalize the concepts of access-based consumption in terms
of ownership, time, and other economic factors and contrast this with traditional
resource leasing and buying.
Chard et al. [8] deal with leveraging the concepts of trust within members of
a close social network to enable them to share heterogeneous resources amongst
each other. The authors claim that social network links formed between people are
based on physical interactions within these people, thus entailing a sense of trust
amongst them. Resource sharing between these users will thus require less external
motivation and persuasion. This paper also discusses different incentive mechanisms
to motivate participation in such a social cloud. The authors evaluate extrinsically
motivating factors like: gaining skills, increase in social reputation and traditional
financial motivation. They also discuss intrinsic motivation such as a feeling of
accomplishment or pride on performing altruistic tasks. In conclusion, the authors
find that such a social cloud for resource sharing, based on real-life relationships
between peers is useful.
16
2.2 Incentive Models
In order to decide the incentive model to be used for promoting participation for
peer-to-peer knowledge sharing on Quet, it was necessary to understand current
implementations of incentive models in various domains. By doing so, we were able
to understand how incentive models are used to leverage participation and how they
are used to reach an optimum state in a peer-to-peer network. Studying different
incentive models also helped us understand the spread of certain behaviors in social
networks due to these varied incentive models.
Hummel et al. [22] carry out a study to increase participation in a learning net-
work (LN) by providing incentives to participating students. The authors design
an incentive mechanism based on Social Exchange Theory i.e. the concept that a
participant’s willingness to contribute/participate in an LN depends on his or her sat-
isfaction with using the LN. Social Exchange Theory proposes that the relationships
we choose to create and maintain are the ones that maximize our rewards and min-
imize our costs. According to this theory, there are broadly 4 incentive mechanisms
to motivate community members to contribute:
1. Personal Access: The participant has a pre-existing expectation that he or
she will receive actionable and useful (extra) information in return. This must
obviously be information that is not accessible without the incentive.
2. Personal Reputation: Improvement in the reputation, visibility or status of a
participant as a result of increased contributions.
3. Social Altruism: Participants understand the role of the underlying LN as
a “social good” and are thus happy to participate and contribute without
receiving tangible benefits.
4. Tangible Rewards: Participants get tangible assets in the form of money, arti-
cles, etc. as a reward for their increased participation.
The authors describe how introducing tangible rewards as incentives can destroy the
notion of the LN; proposing that incentive mechanisms for knowledge-sharing should
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match the spirit of what has to be achieved. The authors implement their incentive
model in the context of an online information sharing forum, thus in their case
the access to more information is more beneficial than other tangible rewards. They
design an incentive mechanism by which participants are granted access to additional
resources and information on their platform. In conclusion, the authors observe
increased active as well as passive (lurkers) participation. It was also observed that
participation is heavy-tailed i.e. only a small portion of the population has a large
amount of participation, which is expected.
Cheng and Vassileva [9] talk about designing an adaptive incentive mechanism
that takes into account the required demand in the network at the current time as
well as the reputation of users, to decide the incentives that should be offered. In
the model proposed in their research, incentives to participate in online knowledge
sharing are not provided uniformly. Larger incentives are provided in initial stages
until the community reaches its critical mass. Incentives are subsequently adapted
so that low-quality information and services are not provided by users. This is done
to avoid information overload in the social network. This adaptive incentive model
was seen to successfully improve user retention and contributions as well as avoid
information overload. In addition to this adaptive incentive mechanism, users are
given reputation points based on the quality and timeliness of the services they
provide as well as the quality of their ratings for other content. Users were assigned
membership levels like gold, silver and bronze based on their reputations and level
of contributions, which served as a mark of high social reputation on the platform.
An important result of this research is that micro payments involve a high cognitive
cost for users (the decision of whether to carry out the transaction or of ‘consuming’
a shared resource when one needs to pay for it) and that social rewards, such as fame
or status in the community can be a stronger motivator for participation since users
don’t need to think too much before asking for a service or contributing. A major
shortcoming of this research was the implementation of the adaptive incentive model.
The number of points earned by a user for contributing are reduced if the supply
exceeds demand i.e. if there are many others willing to contribute. This seems to
be unfair and provides scope for improvement. Further work in this domain saw the
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introduction of a game theoretic approach to designing the incentive mechanism so
as to reach a mutually beneficial outcome for all parties involved (either the platform
and the users, or the users belonging to either the consumer or producer sets).
An interesting application of incentive models to promote participation is crowd-
sourcing. Yang et al. [46] discuss an incentive mechanism for increasing the partic-
ipation of users in a mobile phone sensing crowdsourcing activity. They introduce
some interesting game theoretic approaches to designing the incentive mechanism.
The incentive model proposed by the authors is composed of two parts: a Platform-
Centric Model and a User-Centric Model. The Platform-Centric Incentive Model is
based on a Stackelberg Game in which the platform is the leader and the users are
the followers. The exact incentive is constant for each user in this model. Users
can decide whether or not to participate based on this constant reward and the
total cost they incur while participating in the activity. The authors design the
platform-centric incentive model in such a way that the utility of the platform is
maximized (maximum participation from users in terms of man-hours given their
cost constraints). Besides maximizing the platform utility, this model also ensures
that none of the users can improve their utility by deviating from the platform’s
current strategy. The User-Centric Incentive Model allows each user to provide a
base amount which he or she expects from the platform. The platform must provide
at least this amount to the user. The model is auction-based and the incentive can
be computed efficiently (in polynomial time). The notion of having separate models:
one which is constant and depends only on the platform, and another that depends
on each individual user’s expectation is interesting and can definitely be applied in
various on-demand resource-sharing applications.
Another interesting domain for which designing incentive mechanisms is impor-
tant is that of distributed and peer-to-peer resource sharing. Feldman et al. [14]
model the incentive mechanism for resource sharing on a peer-to-peer network as a
Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. The authors describe another interesting
game theoretic approach to designing the incentive mechanism. They make use of
personal history (analogous to a user’s past experiences with his or her peers in their
previous meetings), shared history (analogous to the overall rating of previous inter-
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actions with peers) as well as social reputation to model their incentive structure.
The authors conclude that a mixed approach (using social reputation as well as hard
incentives) is profitable for both increasing the level of participation on the platform,
as well as for increasing the benefit to each individual user.
Ranganathan et al. [39] provide a very interesting and useful comparison of in-
centive mechanisms that they simulated on a distributed file sharing network. The
authors model the resource sharing problem as a Multi-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
problem stating that people tend not to share resources in P2P networks to pre-
vent individual bandwidth costs, though the global optimum would be reached if
every user shared his or her resources. The specific scenario increased the need for
a robust incentive model since users must be incentivized to share their resources
at the risk of having to incur personal costs. The authors thus propose 3 different
incentive schemes for achieving a global optimum, out of which 1 is a hard incentive
scheme and 2 are soft incentive schemes. The different proposed incentive schemes
are described below:
1. Token-Exchange Model: This is a hard incentive model. Users are given a set of
tokens to begin with and with every file downloaded, they must pay one token
to the file owner. Once they are out of tokens, they cannot download anymore
files. Users can gain tokens by providing their files for sharing. Thus, users
tend to advertise their files in order to gain tokens. This model makes users
hesitate to download files since the cost is high. They must decide whether or
not to spend their token on a given file.
2. Peer-Approved Model: In this model, users are given ratings and they are only
allowed to download files from a user that has a lower or equal rating as them.
This will thus encourage users to advertise their files and increase their ratings.
User ratings can be based on the number of file-requests served or the number
of files advertised by the user. First-time users that do not have files of their
own are allowed to download a small number of files.
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3. Service-Quality Model: This is similar to the Peer-Approved Model, but instead
of restricting user downloads to be served by lower or equal reputation users,
user requests are ranked into service levels according to the user’s rating.
The evaluation provided by the authors suggests that non-pricing schemes may be
more practical to implement in certain kinds of collaborative networks than direct
payments between users. Users may prefer (and thus accept more quickly) schemes
that do not require payments or decisions for each transaction.
In the research carried out by Farzan et al. [13], we again see reward-based in-
centives coupled with reputation. The authors experiment with various incentive
systems, as given below:
• Incentivizing with Rewards: Provide users a material reward for their contri-
bution. This reward can be scaled according to the quality of the user’s par-
ticipation instead of giving a fixed reward to all users regardless of the rating
for their contribution by other users.
• Incentivizing by Explaining Community Benefit: Let users know the benefit
they are causing to other users. Experiments with this model confirmed that
people are more likely to work if they feel that their contribution is important
and beneficial to others. This is similar to an altruistic incentive model. More-
over, it was found that letting the user know the exact beneficiary helps even
more in motivating the user.
• Incentivizing by Goal-Setting: Provide users with intense and specific short-
terms goals. The authors discover that this is more beneficial than providing
them vague long-term goals when it comes to encouraging their participation.
Furthermore, grouping goals are even more helpful in this respect. This can be
seen in practice in many incentive-based applications, for example, LinkedIn
[27] provides users with a progress bar of how complete their profile is, Fitbit
[15] periodically reminds users how close they are to meeting their daily fitness
goals, etc.
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• Incentivizing by Reputation: Provide users with reputation points and ratings
to improve their social standing. The authors find this to be the most beneficial
when designing their incentive model. This kind of incentive mechanism has
proven to be very useful in practice. For example, Flickr [17] addresses a user’s
reputation by highlighting certain content on that user’s profile as “their most
interesting photos”.
• Incentivizing by Providing Self-Benefit: Encourage users’ participation by turn-
ing their feedback into an activity that is important and meaningful to them.
An example of this is using student ratings for courses to show them where
they stand with respect to their career goals.
The authors conclude on using a point-based reputation system to provide incentives.
Along with this, they highlight users with high contributions. They observe higher
participation rates than before and also higher than what they had observed with
just a reward-based system.
2.2.1 Altruism
Another interesting approach to incentivizing participation on resource sharing social
networks is making users aware of the public good of their contributions. Leider et al.
[26] provide an experiment in which they measure how likely people are willing to
help other people depending on how close the other person is to them and depending
on whether they will receive something in return. The authors perform a study in
which they define 3 scenarios:
1. Baseline Altruism: Altruism towards complete strangers.
2. Directed Altruism: Altruism which places friends above strangers.
3. Reward-Based Incentives: A scenario in which users are likely to receive some-
thing for their services in future interactions.
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The authors model situations in which a user would prefer to help his friend and
thereby incur a cost rather than damage their friendship. The authors found that
directed altruism is a much stronger (about twice as strong) factor than the prospect
of future interactions and both are much stronger than baseline altruism. This
suggests that people prefer to help their friends without expecting anything in return,
but will not be willing to do so when it comes to strangers. People tend to expect
something in future interactions with a higher probability when it comes to providing
services to strangers. Another interesting result of this paper was that there is
a tendency for friends to cluster other people by baseline altruism and thus it is
possible that altruistic behavior can spread through the network, but this is only
likely to spread across links that are between close friends.
2.3 Stable Marriage Problem
The Stable Marriage Problem is used to model various scenarios in which the goal
is to find a stable matching between elements belonging to 2 different sets. The key
idea here is the notion of a stable match, which requires that no 2 pairs of matched
participants would be better off trading their respective partners. The theoretical
contributions towards this algorithm were made by Lloyd Shapley and David Gale
in their seminal paper D. Gale [11]. This theoretical work was applied to various
scenarios by Alvin Roth, such as in matching hospitals and doctors, students and
high-schools, kidneys and patients, etc. These various applications of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm won Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley the Nobel Prize in Economics
in 2012. In order to find a stable matching for the Stable Marriage Problem, par-
ticipants belonging to both sets are asked to provide their preference lists for being
matched with participants of the other set. Due to the generic nature of the inputs,
this algorithm can easily be applied to a variety of scenarios. Section 3.4 talks more
in detail about the working of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, as well as the variations
to this algorithm which have been used when developing the matching algorithm
used in Quet.
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CHAPTER 3
QUET: THE ON-DEMAND PEER-TO-PEER
KNOWLEDGE SHARING APP
In this chapter, we describe Quet, the mobile application that we have developed for
on-demand peer-to-peer tutoring and knowledge sharing. We provide an overview of
Quet in section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides a sample working of Quet with the example
of 2 users being matched up. We describe Quet’s underlying incentive model in
section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes how users are matched with the best possible
peers. Finally, we describe Quet’s robust architecture in section 3.5.
3.1 Overview of Quet
In this section, we will provide an overview of Quet. We developed Quet as an appli-
cation for our research on on-demand peer-to-peer tutoring and knowledge sharing.
Quet is an Android app based on a sharing economy model which allows users to
request help in their coursework on-demand. Once users submit their help-request,
Quet uses their preferences, budget and course to match them up with the best avail-
able mentors. Quet also includes the preferences of the matched mentor, their price
per help-request session and their course to make these matches. Once Quet has
matched up users, they are expected to use the in-app chat to physically meet up
and discuss the help-request. Users do not need to worry about finding the best help
available themselves and the application is very easy to use. Section 3.4 describes
how user preference lists are generated and how the matching algorithm works. In
order to understand the basic working of Quet, we first introduce some basic terms
and details of the application.
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• Quet Credits (QC):
Quet uses a virtual currency called “Quet Credits”, abbreviated as “QC”.
These are units of the hard incentive which are transferred from matched
mentees to their respective mentors. Users will initially be given a certain
number of Quet Credits so they can start requesting help on Quet. All trans-
actions on Quet which involve hard incentives make use of Quet Credits. The
experimental setup explained in chapter 4 makes use of the total Quet Credits
accumulated by users (excluding free sessions) in order to pay them at the
end of the experimental period. Thus, Quet Credits can be thought of being
synonymous to actual money.
• Help-request sessions:
Users who wish to use Quet in order to request help and get matched with a
peer, can do so by filling out a simple help-request form. Once a user submits
his or her help-request, they are matched up by Quet to the best available
mentor. A help-request session can be up to 30 minutes long.
• Budget:
Each user when setting up their profile on Quet, specifies his or her budget
when being matched up as a mentee. This is the amount of Quet Credits that
they are willing to pay their matched mentors per help-request session. Quet
ensures that a user requesting help never gets matched up with a peer whose
price is more than the former’s budget. Quet allows only 3 distinct values for
the budget; namely 0, 1, 2 QC. Users who wish to use the application to receive
help for free may specify 0 QC as their budget. The reason we have resorted
to keeping payments this low is that 2 QC (the maximum allowed transaction
amount) is akin to the price of coffee (remember that QC are synonymous to
actual money, or dollars in this case). This is based on the simple observation
that a student receiving help from his or her peer would offer that peer a cup
of coffee out of courtesy anyhow (at least they should). Quet just makes the
arduous task of finding helpful peers easy.
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• Price:
Each user when setting up their profile on Quet, specifies his or her price when
being matched up as a mentor. This is the amount of Quet Credits that they
expect to be paid by their matched mentees per help-request session. Quet
ensures that a user getting matched as a mentor never ends up getting paid
less than their price. Again, Quet allows only 3 distinct values for the price;
namely 0, 1, 2 QC. Users who wish to provide help to their peers for free may
specify 0 QC as their price.
• Optimal budget and price values:
Though there are no fixed optimal values for the budget and price that a user
can set, some obvious facts can be taken into consideration by users. Setting a
low budget will most likely hinder a user’s chances of getting matched up with
a mentor. Conversely, a high budget can increase their chances. Similarly, a
user who sets a low price will have a higher chance of getting matched up with
a mentee and one who sets a high price will have a low matching chance. Thus,
Quet prefers users with altruistic intentions.
• Wallet:
Each user has a wallet on Quet which specifies the total number of Quet Credits
they currently have available. This wallet changes depending on a user’s help-
request interactions with his or her peers. When being matched up as a mentor
with a peer, the user’s wallet is incremented by the payment amount of the
help-request session. Conversely, when being matched up as a mentee, the
corresponding payment amount is deducted from the user’s wallet. The method
used in deciding the payment of each help-request session has been described
below.
• Mentor matching criteria:
Users are asked to set up their matching criteria when being matched up with
someone as a mentor, as part of their profile information. This basically asks
users what kind of mentee they prefer getting matched up with. There are 5
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available options for this criteria which range from preference being given to
the amount of QC earned (pareto 0), to the mentee’s rating (pareto 4). Figure
3.1 shows these possible options. As we will see in section 3.4, this matching
criteria is used to generate the preference list for each matched up mentor.
Figure 3.1: Different possible options for the mentor matching criteria.
• Mentee matching criteria:
Users are asked to set up their matching criteria when being matched up with
someone as a mentee, as part of each help-request that they submit. This
basically asks users what kind of mentor they prefer getting matched up with.
There are 5 available options for this criteria which range from preference being
given to the amount of QC spent per help-request session (pareto 0), to the
mentor’s rating (pareto 4). Figure 3.2 shows these possible options. As we will
see in section 3.4, this matching criteria is used to generate the preference list
for each matched up mentee.
• Payment per help-request session:
The payment amount for a help-request session between a matched mentor and
mentee depends on their respective matching criteria. Quet already ensures
that the matched mentor charges within the budget of the matched mentee.
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Figure 3.2: Different possible options for the mentee matching criteria.
To decide the actual amount that the mentee owes the mentor, Quet must
find the most suitable amount dependent on both user’s matching criteria.
For brevity, we will refer to the mentor’s mentor matching criteria simply as
the mentor matching criteria and the mentee’s mentee matching criteria as
the mentee matching criteria. We look at the mentor matching criteria and
the mentee matching criteria to find the payment amount according to the
matrix provided in figure 3.3. Note the following range for the payment of a
help-request session:
payment ∈ {mentor’s price,mentee’s budget}
From this range, we can see that the mentor would prefer being paid an amount
equivalent to the mentee’s budget since that is the highest that the payment
for that help-request session can be. Conversely, the mentee would prefer being
paid an amount equivalent to the mentor’s price since that is the lowest amount
that the payment for that help-request session can be. From figure 3.3, we see
that the mentor is favored whenever his or her matching criteria is closer to
the first option i.e. pareto 0 than the mentee matching criteria and vice versa
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Figure 3.3: Help-request session payment calculation.
for cases that favor the mentee. When both mentor and mentee have the exact
same matching criteria, we cannot favor one over the other and thus randomly
choose the help-request session payment to be either the mentor’s price or the
mentee’s budget.
• Anonymous ratings:
At the end of each help-request session, the mentor rates his or her matched
mentee and the mentee rates his or her matched mentor. These ratings are
anonymous. Quet does not disclose user ratings at all; in fact, a user is not
even shown his or her own rating. This is done to avoid awkwardness amongst
peers since Quet is designed to be used within a classroom. Thus, each user on
Quet has a list of mentor ratings (ratings given by their matched mentees when
the user was a mentor to them) and a list of mentee ratings (ratings given by
their matched mentors when the user was their mentee). Section 3.4 explains
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how these mentor and mentee ratings are used to generate user preference lists
in the matching algorithm.
3.2 Sample Working of Quet
In this section, we describe a sample working of Quet in order to explain a typical
usage of the application. The case we cover is the general one, without any exceptions
and assuming that neither user cancels the request. We will first describe parts of
the application that are common to all users, including consent pages, the profile
page, etc. For the remaining part of this section, we will explain Quet’s working
with the help of 2 users interacting with each other. Chinmay will assume the role
of a mentee by requesting help and Bill will assume the position of the mentor who
gets matched up to Chinmay via Quet’s matching algorithm.
3.2.1 Application Working Common to All Users
In this section we describe parts of the application that all users see, irrespective of
whether they are assuming the role of a mentor or mentee in a help-request session.
We will go over screenshots of the application to help understand the different stages
involved in these common functionalities.
1. In-app consent documents:
On installing the application, users will be shown the landing page of Quet,
shown in figure 3.4. Users will then be guided through a series of consent
documents explaining them how their privacy is maintained on the application,
their rights as participants in using Quet, some basic information about Quet,
etc. We omit these screenshots for the sake of conciseness. Finally, users are
guided towards the final page which asks them for their consent, as shown in
figure 3.5. If the user chooses not to provide their consent, the application will
be unusable and they will not be allowed to proceed in order to protect their
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privacy, as shown in figure 3.6. On entering a valid Illinois email ID, users are
sent a confirmation email via which they can set up their password to log in to
Quet. A sample confirmation email is shown in figure 3.7.
Figure 3.4: Quet landing page.
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Figure 3.5: Statement of consent page.
Figure 3.6: Error received if the user does not consent to use Quet.
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Figure 3.7: A sample confirmation email sent once the user consents to use Quet.
2. Logging in and creating your profile:
After a user has consented to use Quet and has set up their password, they are
shown the login page (see figure 3.8). If a user is logging in for the first time,
they are prompted to create their Quet profile wherein they are asked to enter
the courses for which they plan on using Quet, their budget, price and mentor
matching criteria. As can be seen from the screenshots shown in figure 3.9,
the user is given an idea of what their optimal budget and price values should
be. Finally, once the user’s profile has been created, they can view their profile
(Chinmay’s profile has been shown in figure 3.10). Note that the profile also
shows the user’s current wallet. The user can choose to edit any aspect of his
or her profile from the profile page by clicking the “Edit Profile” button.
3.2.2 Application Working Specific to Mentee
In this section we describe parts of the application that are specific to the mentee. A
user requests help from his or her profile page. If an available mentor that is matched
by Quet accepts the user’s help-request, they can use the in-app chat in order to
decide when and where to meet up. Once the users have met, the mentee presses the
“Start Session” button. After the mentor has finished helping the mentee, he or she
presses the “End Session” button. Finally, both users are shown a rating page and
then directed back to their respective profile pages. We will go over screenshots of
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Figure 3.8: The login page.
the application to help understand the different stages involved for user’s assuming
the role of a mentee. In our walkthrough example, Chinmay is the mentee.
1. Requesting help:
Users can submit a help-request by pressing the “Request Help” button on their
profile page (see figure 3.10). Figure 3.11 shows screenshots of various pieces of
information that users must enter before submitting their help request. In our
example, Chinmay requests help for the question “How do you find the best
split for decision trees?”. He enters the course that his question pertains to
i.e. CS 412. He also enters his estimation for how long he thinks it may take
for a matched up mentor to help him for this question. Finally, Chinmay also
enters a location where he may be able to meet with the matched mentor, as
well as his mentee matching criteria. Thus, the screenshots in figure 3.11 are
of the mentee’s (Chinmay’s) phone.
2. Possible responses to help-requests submitted:
A user that has submitted a help-request may receive many different responses.
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(a) Basic “Edit Profile” page. (b) Specify budget.
(c) Specify price. (d) Specify mentor matching criteria.
Figure 3.9: Editing your profile.
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Figure 3.10: User’s profile page/home screen.
A brief explanation of possible responses has been provided below.
(a) Can’t be matched: In case Quet is unable to find the help-requester a peer
to match with as a mentor, it will send the help-requester a notification
indicating a failure to match his or her help-request. This may be due to a
number of reasons such as the lack of available peers who can be matched
as potential mentors (users currently engaged in a help-request session are
considered unavailable), a low budget set by the help-requester (note that
Quet will always match a user with a mentor whose price is within the
user’s budget, thus setting a low budget could reduce the user’s chances
of getting matched), etc.
(b) Can’t find a mentor to help for the specific question: In case Quet matches
the help-requester to a mentor who declines the help-request, it will send
the help-requester a notification specifying this. Note that this notification
does not reveal information about the matched mentor who declined the
user’s help-request.
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(a) First view of the “Request Help” page. (b) Second view of the “Request Help” page.
(c) Enter the course. (d) Specify mentee matching criteria.
Figure 3.11: Making a help-request.
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(c) Help-request has timed out: In case Quet matches a help-requester to a
mentor who does not accept or decline the help-request within 15 minutes,
it will send the help-requester a notification specifying that his or her help-
request has timed out. Quet provides matched mentors a time window of
15 minutes to respond to a help-request that they have been matched up
with. Failure to respond (either accept or decline) to the help-request will
lead to this notification being sent to the help-requester.
(d) Found a mentor: In case Quet matches the help-requester to a mentor who
accepts the help-request, it will send a notification to the help-requester
specifying this. In our sample working, Quet matches Chinmay’s help-
request to Bill and sends him a notification. Considering that Bill accepts
Chinmay’s help-request, Chinmay receives a request-acceptance notifica-
tion and his screen changes as shown in figure 3.12. Chinmay now sees
Bill’s name and display picture on his profile indicating that Bill has ac-
cepted his help-request. Information about the accepted help-request is
also shown. Note that both users are now able to use Quet’s in-app chat
to decide when and where to meet up in order to start their help-request
session.
3. Chatting with the matched mentor:
Once the matched mentor has accepted the help-requester’s help-request; the
help-requester assumes the role of the mentee. The mentor and mentee may
now use Quet’s in-app chat to decide when and where to physically meet up.
In our sample working, Bill accepts Chinmay’s help-request. Chinmay and Bill
now use the in-app chat as shown in figure 3.13. The screenshot represents
the mentee’s (Chinmay’s) view of the in-app chat and that is the reason why
information about the matched mentor (Bill) is seen on the screen.
38
(a) The notification sent to Chinmay after Bill
accepts his help-request.
(b) Change in Chinmay’s screen after Bill
accepts his help-request.
Figure 3.12: The match notification and screen change once Chinmay’s
help-request has been accepted by Bill.
4. Cancelling the help-request after the matched mentor has accepted
it:
Both matched users have the option of cancelling the help-request session even
after the matched mentor has accepted it. This option has been kept in order
to handle emergency situations and cases wherein the matched users are unable
to meet up in the near future. Note that this can only be done before the users
have started the help-request session (initiated by the matched mentee pressing
the “Start Session” button). Thus, we can see that the mentee (Chinmay) sees
a “Cancel” button at the bottom of his screen in figure 3.13. A similar “Cancel”
button can also be seen on the mentor’s (Bill’s) screen. Pressing the cancel
button triggers a notification to be sent to the matched user informing him or
her that their match has cancelled the help-request.
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Figure 3.13: Chinmay and Bill use the in-app chat to decide when and where to
meet up.
5. Starting the help-request session:
Once both users decide a time and place to meet up and have physically met
up, the matched mentee presses the “Start Session” button. In our sample
working, Chinmay’s screen shows a “Start Session” button as can be seen in
figure 3.13. Once Chinmay and Bill meet up, Chinmay must press this button
in order to initiate the start of the help-request session.
6. Help-request session time up notification:
Once the matched mentee has pressed the “Start Session” button, Quet will
send both matched users a reminder notification after the entered session time
has run out. In our sample working, Chinmay had submitted a help-request of
20 minutes (refer to figure 3.11), thus Quet will send Chinmay and Bill a “time-
up” reminder notification 20 minutes after Chinmay presses “Start Session”.
This notification only serves the purpose of a reminder and does not force either
users out of the help-request session. Users may continue to be in a session for
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as long as they wish and until the matched mentor presses the “End Session”
button. Note that the matched mentor will only be paid for the original session
and not for the extra time used up after the session has timed up.
7. Rating the matched mentor:
Once the matched mentor has finished helping the mentee satisfactorily, he or
she must press the “End Session” to indicate that their help-request session
has finished. Once the mentor presses the “End Session” button, both users
see a rating page wherein they must rate their matched peer according to their
experience. Figure 3.14 shows what Chinmay (the mentee) sees on his screen
after Bill (the mentor) has ended their help-request session. The mentee may
decide what to rate his or her matched mentor depending on how satisfactory
the mentor’s help was, how the mentor’s attitude was towards providing help,
etc.
Figure 3.14: Chinmay sees the rating page to rate his mentor Bill.
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3.2.3 Application Working Specific to Mentor
In this section we describe parts of the application that are specific to the mentor.
A user may receive a notification from Quet indicating that he or she has been
matched with a help-request. This notification is accompanied by information related
to the help-request (excluding the name and display picture of the help-requester).
A matched mentor has 15 minutes to react to this matched help-request. The user
can choose to decline the request in which case the user is directed back to his or
her profile page. In case the user feels that he or she can provide adequate help for
the matched help-request, the user should accept the help-request. If a user accepts
or declines the help-request after the 15-minute response time, he or she is directed
back to their profile page, since the help-request has timed out. A user that accepts
a help-request will assume the position of the matched mentor and can use Quet’s
in-app chat to decide when and where to meet up with his or her matched mentee.
Once the users have met, the mentee presses the “Start Session” button. After the
mentor has finished helping the mentee, he or she presses the “End Session” button.
Finally, both users are shown a rating page and then directed back to their respective
profile pages. We will go over screenshots of the application to help understand the
different stages involved for user’s assuming the role of a mentor. In our walkthrough
example, Bill is the mentor.
1. Getting matched as a mentor:
If a user gets matched up as a mentor for a particular help-request, he or she
receives a notification from Quet. Along with the notification, the user is shown
information about the help-request. This includes the question, the course it
pertains to, the estimated time for the help-request (as entered by the help-
requester), the payment they would receive if they accept the help-request and
the location entered by the help-requester. Note that the user that has been
matched as a mentor does not see the help-requester’s information (display
name and profile picture), until the matched user accepts the help-request.
This is done to prevent users from deciding to accept or decline help-requests
depending on who asks for help. If the matched user declines the help-request,
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he or she is directed back to his or her profile page. As mentioned previously, a
matched user has 15 minutes to respond to a help-request. If the user responds
(accepts or declines) after this stipulated time, a “request timed out” error is
shown to the user and the user is directed back to his or her profile page. Figure
3.15 shows the notification containing the payment information and the screen
with the help-request information, as seen on the mentor’s (Bill’s) phone.
(a) The notification sent to Bill after Quet
matches him up as a mentor for Chinmay’s
help-request. Note that the payment for the
help-request is mentioned in the notification.
(b) Change in Bill’s screen after being matched
up as a mentor. Note that information about
Chinmay is not yet visible to Bill.
Figure 3.15: The match notification and screen change once Chinmay’s
help-request has been matched up to Bill.
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2. Accepting the help-request:
If the matched up user accepts the help-request before it times out, he or she
assumes the role of as mentor and is able to see the mentee’s information.
The mentor and mentee are also able to chat with each other. In our sample
working, Bill accepts Chinmay’s help-request and is thus able to see Chinmay’s
information on the previous screen that showed him information about the
help-request (see figure 3.16).
Figure 3.16: Bill accepts Chinmay’s help-request and is thus able to see Chinmay’s
information and chat with him.
3. Chatting with the matched mentee:
After accepting the help-request, the matched mentor and mentee can use the
in-app chat to decide when and where to meet up. Figure 3.17 shows us what
Bill’s screen looks like while he is chatting with his matched mentee, Chinmay.
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Figure 3.17: Bill’s screen as he chats with Chinmay using Quet’s in-app chat.
4. Cancelling the help-request:
A mentor may cancel his or her matched help-request even though he or she
has already accepted it. This may be done until the matched mentee starts the
help-request session.
5. Screen change after mentee starts the help-request session:
Once the matched mentor and mentee have physically met up; the mentee
presses the “Start Session” button. As soon as the “Start Session” button is
pressed, the mentor’s screen changes such that the “Cancel” button is replaced
by an “End Session” button. Figure 3.18 shows the change in Bill’s screen
after Chinmay presses the “Start Session” button. Similarly, once the mentee
presses the “Start Session” button, the “Cancel” button will be removed from
his or her screen.
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Figure 3.18: Bill’s screen after Chinmay has pressed “Start Session”. Note that the
“Cancel” button is replaced with the “End Session” button.
6. Ending the help-request session:
Once the mentor has finished helping the mentee, he or she presses the “End
Session” button. If the help-request session has not ended within the estimated
time submitted by the mentee while requesting help (20 minutes in our sample
working example), Quet will send “time up” reminder notifications to both the
matched mentor and mentee. Once the mentor has ended the session, both
users see the rating page. In our sample working, the mentor (Bill) sees the
screen as shown in figure 3.19.
We describe the overall working of a typical interaction between 2 users matched up
on Quet in the flowchart given in figure 3.20. This flowchart describes the interaction
between the mentor Bill and the mentee Chinmay in our sample working.
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Figure 3.19: Bill sees the rating page to rate Chinmay.
Figure 3.20: Flowchart describing the help-request session between Bill and
Chinmay.
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3.3 Incentive Model
Chapter 2 provides us with a detail description of existing research on incentive
models. Some key points based on these research papers that were considered while
designing the incentive model in Quet have been explained below.
• Importance of reputation-based incentives: Reputation-based incentive models
tend to be more effective than ones that provide direct rewards, like money.
The reason for this is the hesitation that users face while spending money,
which can prevent them from seeking services. The producers of these services
have in fact found to have a nearly equal level of participation irrespective of
whether the incentive is reputation-based or money-based.
• Adaptive incentive models: Platform-centric incentives must adapt according
to the current demand-supply trends in the system. Though Quet does not
use platform-centric incentives, it implicitly increases the probability of high-
charging users to be matched up as mentors if the demand for help increases.
• Combining soft and hard incentives: A lot of research suggests using a com-
bination of soft and hard incentives. Soft incentives involve increased access
to information, increased social reputation, increased access to services on the
platform, etc. Hard incentives are generally monetary in nature.
• Gamification: Users can be given short-term goals to achieve, for example:
Help x users this week, where x depends on the current level of demand. An-
other approach to achieving this is making users aware of highly active partic-
ipants on the platform. This in turn can motivate them to increase their own
level of participation.
• Appreciating active users: Intermittently broadcasting users that provide reg-
ular services to other users on the platform has found to be a very effective
means to maintaining a high level of participation.
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• Social Exchange Theory: Matching users up with mentors who they gave high
ratings in their previous interactions with a higher probability, is likely to be
more beneficial to them. This observation is in line with the Social Exchange
Theory.
• Reputation proportional to quality of service: Make the reputation points that
a user gets from providing his or her services proportional to the rating received
by his or her matched up peer.
Based on the above observations, we have devised an incentive model specific to the
classroom context in which Quet is designed to be deployed. The incentive model
implemented within Quet has the following salient features:
• Hard incentives:
Users set their price as part of their Quet profile. When being matched up as a
mentor for a peer, the user is guaranteed at least as much as their price, as the
payment for each specific help-request session. The payment received serves as
a (hard) incentive for users.
• Soft incentives:
In order to incentivize participation via social reputation, Quet sends out
broadcast notifications to all users informing them of the highest rated mentors.
The actual mentor ratings of the mentors are not revealed, but their names are
shown in order to motivate users that value social reputation.
• Altruism:
Quet allows users to set a zero price for providing help. Not only will this
motivate users who wish to provide help out of altruism, but will also increase
the chances of altruistic users getting matched up as mentors. Section 3.4
describes how feasible candidates are chosen for each user before ranking them
according to the user’s preferences. This candidate list generation phase is
dependent on the price of a candidate mentor and the budget of a candidate
mentee, apart from other factors.
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• Gamification and appreciation to increase motivation:
Broadcasting top-rated mentors not only serves as a direct soft incentive for
users to participate, but also draws upon the studies of incentive mechanisms
described previously, to use user appreciation to gamify participation. We hope
to see a spirit of friendly competition amongst users to help as many peers as
possible. By broadcasting user names, users who see a friend’s name as a top-
rated mentor may be motivated to also perform better and help as many peers
as they can, in hopes of getting their name up on the top-rated mentor’s list.
• Preferential matching of candidates providing high quality of service:
Quet makes use of user ratings to decide the best possible matches, apart from
other factors (explained in section 3.4). Though these ratings are anonymous,
Quet’s matching algorithm makes use of these ratings in the background in
order to sort candidate matches. In general, users with high mentor ratings
will have a higher likelihood of appearing at the top of their peer’s preference
lists than users with low mentor ratings.
• Preferential matching of low cost mentors:
Users who set low price values will be within the budget of a larger number of
peers than users who set high price values. By ensuring that a help-requester
(possible mentee) never pays more than his or her budget, Quet enforces a
probable mentor user to be feasible only if his or her price is within the help-
requester’s budget.
• Preferential matching of high budget mentees:
Users who set high budget values will be feasible candidates for a larger number
of peer mentors than users who set low budget values. This is the converse of
the above-mentioned point and is due to Quet’s restriction on help-request
payments being at least as much as the price of the matched mentor.
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• Avoiding the free rider problem:
New users are initially provided with some initial Quet Credits in order to
get started with requesting help on Quet. Once this initial amount has been
consumed, users are required to help their peers (in order to potentially earn
Quet Credits), before they are allowed to request help again. This is done
to avoid free riding on the application and to prevent users from using the
application just for requesting help and never providing help themselves. Of
course, a user who has 0 QC in his or her wallet and a 0 budget can still
potentially be matched up with an altruistic peer (one whose price is 0 QC),
but as mentioned previously, the chances of such a user being matched is low.
Thus, the incentive model implemented in Quet makes use of a combination of virtual
currency (translated to money) and social reputation in order to motivate users to
contribute on this platform.
3.4 Matching Algorithm
In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the matching algorithm used within
Quet to find the best possible matches of mentors to mentees. We first describe the
methods used to generate preference lists for each user, wherein feasible candidates
are ranked for each user. We later describe the variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
used to find the best possible matches.
As mentioned in section 3.1, each user has a list of mentor ratings and a list of
mentee ratings. Throughout this chapter, whenever we mention “mentor’s rating”,
we are referring to the user’s average mentor rating. Similarly, whenever we mention
“mentee’s rating”, we are referring to the user’s average mentee rating. Note that
users are not matched immediately as they submit their help-requests. The matching
algorithm is run every 20 minutes and users that had submitted their help-requests
within this matching cycle are matched to the best available mentors according to the
preferences of both the user and the matched mentor. This waiting period for each
matching cycle is essential in order to obtain the best possible mentor-mentee matches
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according to the preference lists generated for both types of users and according to
the output of our variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
3.4.1 Generating User Preference Lists
At the beginning of each matching cycle, the help-requests submitted in that cycle
are retrieved. In this section, we first describe the process of finding a set of feasible
mentors for each help-request submitted. Similarly, we also populate a set of feasible
mentees for each of these feasible mentors. Later, we explain how these feasible
candidates are sorted according to user preferences.
3.4.1.1 Populating the Feasible Candidate Lists
The procedure used in populating feasible candidate lists for help-requesters and
each of their feasible candidate mentors is explained below.
1. For every help-request that is submitted, we find all candidate mentors that
are feasible for that help-request.
2. Since a help-requester can specify a different mentee matching criteria with
every help-request, each help-request should be considered as a separate candi-
date to be matched with an available mentor. Thus, if a user submits multiple
help-requests within a single matching cycle, each help-request is considered
as a separate candidate. Each candidate (called a help-request object from
now on) is implemented as a tuple of mentee user id and the question id of the
help-request.
3. Note that users that have requested help in a matching cycle are not considered
as candidate mentors for that matching cycle since a user expecting help may
not appreciate being matched as a mentor with someone else, before having
received help first.
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4. Feasible mentors for a given help-request are found using the budget of the
help-requester, the course that the help-request pertains to, the price of the
candidate mentor user and the courses that the candidate mentor user has
signed up for.
5. Feasible mentors for a help-request are those users who have signed up for the
course mentioned in the help-request and who charge within the budget of the
help-requester.
6. Feasible mentors for each help-request are populated. Thus, we generate a
dictionary mapping from help-request object to a list of feasible mentors.
7. We can use this dictionary mapping to create a reverse mapping for each of
the feasible mentors. We thus populate each help-request object whose list of
feasible mentors contains the specified user. The list of feasible mentees for
each available user thus consists of all the help-request objects for which this
user is a feasible mentor.
8. Note that we call this a feasible “mentee” list, though this is actually a feasible
“help-request object” list. This is done for the sake of simplicity. Thus, we
generate a dictionary mapping from mentor to a list of help-request objects.
3.4.1.2 Obtaining Pareto Frontier Candidates
In the previous subsection, we saw how to generate the feasible candidate lists. The
2 sets of feasible candidate lists obtained i.e. (help-request object to list of feasible
mentors; and the mentor to list of feasible help-request objects) are unsorted. In this
subsection, we describe the generic algorithm for finding candidates that lie on the
Pareto frontier and those that have been dominated. When finding Pareto frontier
mentors (for each help-request object), we compare candidates based on their price
(x-axis) and their mentor rating (y-axis). Similarly, when finding Pareto frontier
mentees (for each mentor), we compare candidates based on their budget (x-axis)
and their mentee rating (y-axis).
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Algorithm 1 goes over the pseudocode for the function GetParetoFrontier, which
is used for retrieving candidates lying on the Pareto frontier and candidates that
have been dominated by these Pareto frontier candidates. This function can be
used both in the case of mentees and mentors. The function GetParetoFrontier
is given a list of feasible candidates sorted according to the price (cheapest first) if
the candidates are mentors, and budget (highest paying first) if the candidates are
mentees. The algorithm starts off with that candidate who has the most desirable
(x-axis) attribute i.e. the cheapest mentor or the highest paying mentee. We then
iterate over the remaining candidates, subsequently adding them to the list of Pareto
frontier candidates if their rating is at least as much as the previously added Pareto
frontier candidate. If the current candidate’s rating is lower than the previously
added Pareto frontier candidate, this candidate is clearly a poor choice as compared
to the previously added Pareto frontier candidate since it has both a less desirable
(x-axis) attribute and also has a lower rating. Specifically, a dominated mentor
candidate would be one who is more expensive than the previously added Pareto
frontier mentor and who also has a lower mentor rating than him or her. Similarly, a
dominated mentee candidate would be one whose budget is lower than the previously
added Pareto frontier mentee and who also has a lower mentee rating than him or
her.
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Algorithm 1 Finding the candidates lying on the Pareto frontier and those that
have been dominated.
1: function GetParetoFrontier(l) . “l”: list
of feasible candidates sorted according to the price (ascending) for mentors and
budget (descending) for mentees.
2: P ← l[0] . List to store Pareto frontier candidates.
3: D ← [ ] . List to store dominated candidates.
4: for each x ∈ l[1 :] do
5: front← P.getFront()
6: if x.rating ≥ front.rating then
7: P ← P + [x] . Append the current candidate to the Pareto
frontier candidates.
8: else
9: D ← D + [x] . Append the current candidate to the list of
dominated candidates.
10: end if
11: end for return P,D
12: end function
• Obtaining Pareto frontier candidates for mentees:
In order to find mentors from a given help-request object’s feasible mentor list,
who are either part of the Pareto frontier or are dominated candidates for that
help-request object, we call the function GetParetoFrontier described in al-
gorithm 1, passing this list of feasible mentors sorted by their price (cheapest
first). In this implementation, we use the mentor’s ratings as the candidate
ratings. Since we are analyzing this for the case of mentees, we must consider
a trade-off between a mentor’s price (x-axis) and the mentor’s rating (y-axis).
Feasible mentors lying on the Pareto frontier for a mentee are those mentors
that are all Pareto efficient. Mentors that are dominated by these Pareto fron-
tier candidates are those that are more expensive than the previously added
mentor, despite being lower rated than them.
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Figure 3.21 shows an example of how Pareto frontier candidates and dominated
candidates might be distributed for a given mentee. Note that the feasible
mentors can have a price only up to the mentee’s budget. The mentor rating
(y-axis) is the average mentor rating received by the feasible mentors over their
past help-request sessions wherein they were mentors. The sorted candidate list
passed to GetParetoFrontier in this case would be [A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H, I, J ].
Note that for mentors with the same price, we prefer the higher rated mentor
when sorting. The P list (containing candidate mentors on the Pareto fron-
tier) that we obtain is: [A,B,D, F,G, I] and the dominated candidate list is:
[C,E,H, J ].
Figure 3.21: Example of mentors lying on the Pareto frontier and those that are
dominated for a given help-request object.
• Obtaining Pareto frontier candidates for mentors:
In order to find mentees (corresponding to help-request objects) from a given
mentor’s feasible help-request object list, who are either part of the Pareto
frontier or are dominated candidates for that mentor, we call the function
GetParetoFrontier described in algorithm 1, passing this list of feasible help-
request objects sorted by their mentee’s budget (highest paying first). In this
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implementation, we use the mentee’s ratings as the candidate ratings. Since we
are analyzing this for the case of mentors, we must consider a trade-off between
a mentee’s budget (x-axis) and the mentee’s rating (y-axis). Feasible mentees
lying on the Pareto frontier for a mentor are those mentees that are all Pareto
efficient. Mentees that are dominated by these Pareto frontier candidates are
those with lower budgets and lower ratings than the previously added mentee.
Figure 3.22 shows an example of how Pareto frontier candidates and dominated
candidates might be distributed for a given mentor. Note that the feasible
mentees can only pay as low as the mentor’s price. The mentee rating (y-axis) is
the average mentee rating received by the feasible mentees over their past help-
request sessions wherein they were mentees. The sorted candidate list passed
to GetParetoFrontier in this case would be [A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H, I, J ]. Note
that for mentees with the same budget, we prefer the higher rated mentee when
sorting. The P list (containing candidate mentees on the Pareto frontier) that
we obtain is: [A,B,D, F,G, I] and the dominated candidate list is: [C,E,H, J ].
Figure 3.22: Example of mentees lying on the Pareto frontier and those that are
dominated for a given mentor.
An understanding of candidates on the Pareto frontier is essential to explain how
preference lists are generated from the list of feasible candidates. In the following
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subsubsections, we describe the methods used to sort feasible candidate lists accord-
ing to the mentee and mentor matching criteria respectively.
3.4.1.3 Sorting Feasible Mentors According to the Mentee Matching
Criteria
In this subsection, we describe how the list of feasible mentors pertaining to each
help-request object is sorted according to the mentee matching criteria. Note that
a user supplies a matching criteria when submitting each help-request. We have
described the different possible options for the mentee matching criteria in section 3.1.
Algorithm 2 goes over the pseudocode for retrieving a sorted list of feasible mentors
depending on the corresponding help-request object’s mentee matching criteria.
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Algorithm 2 Sorting the list of feasible mentors according to the mentee matching
criteria.
1: function SortFeasibleMentors(c, l) . “c”: mentee matching criteria,
“l”: list of feasible mentors.
2: if c = pareto 4 then
3: S ← sorted(l, key = [(mentor ratings, -), (price, +)])
4: else
5: S Price← sorted(l, key = [(price, +), (mentor ratings, -)])
6: if c = pareto 0 then
7: S ← S Price
8: else . Using S Price to sort based on Pareto frontier candidates.
9: P,D ← GetParetoFrontier(S Price)
10: if c = pareto 1 then
11: S ← P + D
12: else if c = pareto 2 then
13: S ← Shuffle(P ) + Shuffle(D)
14: else
15: S ← P.Reverse() + sorted(D, key = [(mentor ratings, -)])
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if return S
19: end function
The SortFeasibleMentors function takes the mentee matching criteria and the
mentee’s list of feasible mentors as its arguments. We provide a brief explanation of
its working, below.
• Pareto 4: Only care about the mentor’s rating:
If the mentee matching criteria is pareto 4, we only care about the mentor’s
rating and thus we sort the list of feasible mentors according to their mentor
rating in descending order. Note on line 3 that, although we only care about
the mentor rating, we also apply the mentor’s price as the second key for sorting
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(in ascending order). This is done to break ties. Thus, we would still choose the
cheaper of 2 mentors with equally high mentor ratings, in spite of the mentee
matching criteria being pareto 4.
• Sorting by mentor’s price:
For all other mentee matching criteria, we must sort the feasible mentors ac-
cording to their price (cheapest first). Again we note on line 5 that we use
both keys for sorting, in order to break ties.
• Pareto 0: Only care about the QC spent:
If the mentee chooses this matching criteria, we wish to find the cheapest
possible mentor, without caring about the mentor’s rating. As we have already
sorted the feasible mentors according to their price (cheapest first) on line 5,
this case simply requires us to return this list (see line 7).
• Pareto frontier and dominated candidates:
For mentee matching criteria pareto 1, pareto 2 and pareto 3, we must first
obtain a list of feasible mentors lying on the Pareto frontier (referenced on
line 9 as P ) and a list of feasible mentors that have been dominated by these
Pareto frontier candidates (referenced on line 9 as D). We have described the
working of the GetParetoFrontier function in algorithm 1). An interesting
thing to note is that there is no notion of preference amongst the Pareto frontier
candidates unless we specify which dimension is important to us i.e. they have
equal utility. The same goes for dominated candidates. Thus, depending on
the mentee matching criteria, (either pareto 1, pareto 2, or pareto 3), we are
able to sort candidates within these respective lists.
• Pareto 1: Prefer low QC spent over mentor’s rating:
If the mentee matching criteria is pareto 1, we give higher preference to finding
a mentor who charges low than to a mentor who is highly rated. Note however
that we are not completely indifferent towards the mentor’s rating. Candi-
dates in the P (Pareto frontier) list obtained from the GetParetoFrontier
function (see algorithm 1) are already sorted according to their price (cheapest
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to most expensive). Similarly, candidates in the D (dominated candidates) list
obtained from the GetParetoFrontier function (see algorithm 1) are also al-
ready sorted according to their price (cheapest to most expensive). In order to
give importance to mentor ratings, we must prefer Pareto frontier candidates
over dominated candidates. The preference list in this case (see line 11) is the
list of candidates lying on the Pareto frontier appended with the list of domi-
nated candidates, thus giving a higher preference to Pareto frontier candidates
than dominated candidates.
• Pareto 2: Care equally about the QC spent and the mentor’s rating:
If the mentee matching criteria is pareto 2, we give no preference to either
the mentor’s price or the mentor’s rating. We do, however, wish to give a
higher preference towards candidates lying on the Pareto frontier than to those
that have been dominated. There is no need to rank candidates within either
lists according to either price or rating, though. We can see on line 13, that
in order to achieve this, we simply randomly shuﬄe candidates belonging to
the Pareto frontier and append that preference list to a randomly shuﬄed
list of dominated candidates. This ensures that Pareto frontier candidates are
preferred over dominated candidates, without ordering candidates within either
lists according to any criteria.
• Pareto 3: Prefer high mentor rating over the QC spent:
If the mentee matching criteria is pareto 3, we wish to give a higher preference
to the mentor’s rating over his or her price. Note that the Pareto frontier list
of candidates (P ) that we obtain from the GetParetoFrontier function (see
algorithm 1) goes from lowest rated Pareto frontier candidate to highest rated
Pareto frontier candidate. Thus, simply reversing this list produces the desired
ordering amongst the Pareto frontier candidates. The dominated candidates
list (D), however is not guaranteed to be reverse sorted according to mentor
rating, thus we must explicitly sort this list so that higher rated dominated
candidate mentors are given preference over lower rated dominated candidate
mentors. Again, we still prefer Pareto frontier candidates over dominated can-
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didates and thus append the sorted dominated candidates to the (reverse) list
of Pareto frontier candidates, as can be seen on line 15.
• Preference lists obtained from figure 3.21:
Figure 3.21 shows an example of feasible mentors for a given help-request ob-
ject. The mentor preference lists obtained for different mentee matching criteria
in this specific example are provided in figure 3.23. We can see how drastically
the preference list can change depending on the matching criteria.
Figure 3.23: Preference lists obtained for different mentee matching criteria for
candidates shown in figure 3.21.
3.4.1.4 Sorting Feasible Mentees According to the Mentor Matching
Criteria
In this subsection, we describe how the list of feasible help-request objects (pertaining
to each help-request submitted by a probable mentee) is sorted according to the
mentor matching criteria. Note that a user sets the mentor matching criteria while
setting up his or her Quet profile. We have described the different possible options for
the mentor matching criteria in section 3.1. Algorithm 3 goes over the pseudocode
for retrieving a sorted list of feasible mentees (each mentee corresponding to their
respective help-request object), depending on the mentor matching criteria.
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Algorithm 3 Sorting the list of feasible mentees according to the mentor matching
criteria.
1: function SortFeasibleMentees(c, l) . “c”: mentor matching criteria,
“l”: list of feasible mentees.
2: if c = pareto 4 then
3: S ← sorted(l, key = [(mentee ratings, -), (budget, -)])
4: else
5: S Budget← sorted(l, key = [(budget, -), (mentee ratings, -)])
6: if c = pareto 0 then
7: S ← S Budget
8: else . Using S Budget to sort based on Pareto frontier candidates.
9: P,D ← GetParetoFrontier(S Budget)
10: if c = pareto 1 then
11: S ← P + D
12: else if c = pareto 2 then
13: S ← Shuffle(P ) + Shuffle(D)
14: else
15: S ← P.Reverse() + sorted(D, key = [(mentee ratings, -)])
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if return S
19: end function
The SortFeasibleMentees function takes the mentor matching criteria and the
mentor’s list of feasible mentees as its arguments. We provide a brief explanation of
its working, below.
• Pareto 4: Only care about the mentee’s rating:
If the mentor matching criteria is pareto 4, we only care about the mentee’s
rating and thus we sort the list of feasible mentees according to their mentee
rating in descending order. Note on line 3 that, though we only care about the
mentee rating, we also apply the mentee’s budget as the second key for sorting
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(in descending order). This is done to break ties. Thus, we would still choose
the higher paying of 2 mentees with equally high mentee ratings, in spite of
the mentor matching criteria being pareto 4.
• Sorting by mentee’s budget:
For all other mentor matching criteria, we must sort the feasible mentees ac-
cording to their budget (highest paying first). Again we note on line 5 that we
use both keys for sorting, in order to break ties.
• Pareto 0: Only care about the QC earned:
If the mentor chooses this matching criteria, we wish to find the highest paying
mentee, without caring about the mentee’s rating. As we have already sorted
the feasible mentees according to their budget (highest paying first) on line 5,
this case simply requires us to return this list (see line 7).
• Pareto frontier and dominated candidates:
For mentor matching criteria pareto 1, pareto 2 and pareto 3, we must first
obtain a list of feasible mentees lying on the Pareto frontier (referenced on
line 9 as P ) and a list of feasible mentees that have been dominated by these
Pareto frontier candidates (referenced on line 9 as D). We have described the
working of the GetParetoFrontier function in algorithm 1. As explained in the
previous subsection, there is no notion of preference amongst the Pareto frontier
candidates unless we specify which dimension is important to us i.e. they have
equal utility. The same goes for dominated candidates. Thus, depending on
the mentor matching criteria, (either pareto 1, pareto 2, or pareto 3), we are
able to sort candidates within these respective lists.
• Pareto 1: Prefer high QC earned over mentee’s rating:
If the mentor matching criteria is pareto 1, we give higher preference to finding
a mentee who has a high budget than to a mentee who is highly rated. Note
however that we are not completely indifferent towards the mentee’s rating.
Candidates in the P (Pareto frontier) list obtained from the GetParetoFrontier
function (see algorithm 1) are already sorted according to their budget (highest
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budget to lowest budget). Similarly, candidates in the D (dominated candi-
dates) list obtained from the GetParetoFrontier function (see algorithm 1) are
also already sorted according to their budget (highest budget to lowest budget).
In order to give importance to mentee ratings, we must prefer Pareto frontier
candidates over dominated candidates. The preference list in this case (see line
11) is the list of candidates lying on the Pareto frontier appended with the
list of dominated candidates, thus giving a higher preference to Pareto frontier
candidates than dominated candidates.
• Pareto 2: Care equally about the QC earned and the mentee’s rating:
If the mentor matching criteria is pareto 2, we give no preference to either the
mentee’s budget or the mentee’s rating. We do, however, wish to give a higher
preference towards candidates lying on the Pareto frontier than to those that
have been dominated. There is no need to rank candidates within either lists
according to either budget or rating, though. We can see on line 13, that
in order to achieve this, we simply randomly shuﬄe candidates belonging to
the Pareto frontier and append that preference list to a randomly shuﬄed
list of dominated candidates. This ensures that Pareto frontier candidates are
preferred over dominated candidates, without ordering candidates within either
lists according to any criteria.
• Pareto 3: Prefer high mentee rating over the QC earned:
If the mentor matching criteria is pareto 3, we wish to give a higher preference
to the mentee’s rating over his or her budget. Note that the Pareto frontier list
of candidates (P ) that we obtain from the GetParetoFrontier function (see
algorithm 1) goes from lowest rated Pareto frontier candidate to highest rated
Pareto frontier candidate. Thus, simply reversing this list produces the desired
ordering amongst the Pareto frontier candidates. The dominated candidates
list (D), however is not guaranteed to be reverse sorted according to mentee
rating, thus we must explicitly sort this list so that higher rated dominated
candidate mentees are given preference over lower rated dominated candidate
mentees. Again, we still prefer Pareto frontier candidates over dominated can-
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didates and thus append the sorted dominated candidates to the (reverse) list
of Pareto frontier candidates, as can be seen on line 15.
• Preference lists obtained from figure 3.22:
Figure 3.22 shows an example of feasible mentees for a given mentor. The
mentee preference lists obtained for different mentor matching criteria in this
specific example are provided in figure 3.24. We can see how drastically the
preference list can change depending on the matching criteria.
Figure 3.24: Preference lists obtained for different mentor matching criteria for
candidates shown in figure 3.22.
3.4.2 Finding Stable Matches for Mentors and Mentees
In this subsection we describe the stable marriage problem and the Gale-Shapley
algorithm to find stable matches. We also describe our variation of the algorithm for
unequal sets. Given 2 sets of elements of equal size with an ordered preference list
for each element, the stable marriage problem deals with finding a stable matching
between elements belonging to the 2 different sets.
Stable Matching: A matching is said to be stable if it exhibits Pareto efficiency.
This ensures that there does not exist any match (x, y) which both x and y individ-
ually profit more from, than their current match.
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3.4.2.1 Handling Unequal Mentor-Mentee Sets
In subsection 3.4.1, we have explained how feasible candidates are retrieved for help-
requesters and probable mentors. We also describe the methods used to sort these
candidate lists according to the matching criteria specified by candidates. By apply-
ing the methods described previously, we generate 2 preference lists: A help-request
object to list of mentors list and a mentor to list of help-request objects (mentee)
list. An important point to be noted is that the size of these lists are most likely
unequal i.e. the number of available users who can be probable mentors, will mostly
be different from the number of help-requesters for that matching cycle (probable
mentees). We cannot directly apply the Gale-Shapley algorithm for finding stable
matches since it is applicable for equal size sets of elements. We make both preference
lists to be of equal size by processing these lists as mentioned below.
1. Adding infeasible candidates last:
The preference list for a help-request object (pertaining to a mentee) may not
contain all the possible available users who are probable mentors. The reason
for this is that there could exist many users who are available, but either have
not registered for the course corresponding to that help-request object, or whose
price is higher than the mentee’s budget. These candidates are infeasible for
the given mentee, but without including them, our preference lists would be
incomplete. In order to avoid this, all infeasible candidates are appended to the
end of each user’s preference list. An analogous method is followed in the case
of mentors and their infeasible mentee matches. By adding these candidates
to the end of each user’s preference list, we ensure that they are given a low
priority when running the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
2. Handling unequal sets:
Even after ensuring that all probable mentors are in all the mentees’ preference
lists and vice versa, we still face the problem of unequal sets. In most scenarios,
the number of help-requests submitted (and thus the number of help-request
objects) would not be the same as the number of available candidate mentors.
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For example, there could be 10 available candidate mentors and just 7 help-
requests for a given matching cycle. In such a scenario, we must add dummy
nodes to equalize both sets. We do this by randomly picking a key from the
smaller set (the mentee set in our example). We use the reverse of the preference
list of this randomly chosen user (a random mentee in our example) as our
dummy preference list. We reverse the chosen preference list since we do not
want an actual user to get a lower preference due to a dummy node. Now, we
must add dummy nodes (3 in our example) to the smaller set such that these
dummy nodes’ preference lists contain all the users of the other set. Finally,
for each dummy node that we added in the smaller set, we append a random
permutation of these dummy nodes to each user’s preference list who belongs
to the larger set (the mentor set in our example).
3.4.2.2 Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Once both mentor and mentee preference lists are of equal size, we apply the Gale-
Shapley algorithm to find stable matches. Algorithm 4 shows the Gale-Shapley
algorithm for the case of Quet’s mentor-mentee matching.
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Algorithm 4 The Gale-Shapley algorithm applied to Quet to find stable mentor-
mentee matches.
1: function GetMentorMenteeMatches(M, P) . “M”: Dictionary of
mentor preference lists, “P”: Dictionary of mentee preference lists.
2: S ← [ ] . Store stable matches in S.
3: m← free ∀m ∈M . Make all mentors free.
4: p← free ∀p ∈ P . Make all mentees free.
5: while ∃free mentor m not yet matched with a mentee p do
6: p←M [m].next() . Get m’s most preferred mentee, that m hasn’t
tried matching with yet.
7: if p is free then
8: S ← S + [(m, p)] . Tentatively store this match.
9: else if (m′, p) ∈ S then . Another tentative match of p exists.
10: if p prefers m to m′ then
11: S ← S − [(m′, p)] . Remove previous match.
12: . m′ becomes free.
13: S ← S + [(m, p)] . Tentatively store this match.
14: else . (m′, p) remain matched.
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while return S
18: end function
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for Quet’s case of matching mentors to mentees works
by initializing all mentors and mentees to be free. Each mentor m tries to match
with his or her most preferred mentee p. Every mentee chooses to match with that
mentor who tries to match with him or her, and who the mentee prefers over all other
mentors who have tried matching with him or her. If p is currently unmatched, we
tentatively add the match (m, p) to the matched set S. If the mentor m tries to match
with a mentee p who is already tentatively matched up with another mentor m′, we
either break the match or keep it. If p prefers m over the previously matched mentor
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m′, we remove the match (m′, p) from S and add the tentative match (m,p) to S.
Each mentor who remains free or unmatched after the previous step subsequently
tries to match with his or her next preferred mentee (according to his or her prefer-
ence list). We continue this as long as there are unmatched mentors and mentees.
Finally, we reach a state wherein all the mentors have been matched with mentees
and all matches made are stable. Harrenstein et al. [21] provide many more such
interesting applications and explanations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in various
fields, including hospital-patient matching, kidney-donor matching, supply-demand
matching in economics, etc.
An important point to remember is to prune infeasible and dummy matches from
the stable matches obtained. In order to do this, we must also maintain the set
of feasible candidates for each user. Once the stable matches have been found by
applying the Gale-Shapley algorithm, we must only retain those matches that are
between candidates that are feasible for one another.
Thus, the final output is a list of pairs for mentor to (mentee, help-request ID)
matches. Once we obtain these pairs, we notify matched mentors as explained in
section 3.2.
3.5 System Architecture and Design
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the system architecture of Quet. We
also describe the design goals that had been kept in mind when implementing Quet.
3.5.1 Backend Components
The Quet backend system runs entirely on DigitalOcean [12]. Different backend
components were programmed in Python 2.7.6 [36]. Quet runs on a Python Flask
[37] server and uses SQL (MySQL) [29], NoSQL (MongoDB) [28] and GraphDB
(Neo4j) [30] data stores. Quet uses Celery [6] and celery beat [7] with a RabbitMQ
[38] message broker to handle asynchronous and periodic tasks respectively. The
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targeted clients for Quet are smartphone users running any mobile OS. Quet has
been built as a platform-agnostic hybrid mobile application. Our current deployment
of Quet is for Android users. The system is flexible enough to incorporate a Website-
based application at a later point in time. This will enable web browser support as
well. In this section we describe various backend components used in Quet.
• DigitalOcean server details:
DigitalOcean is a pay-per demand cloud infrastructure provider. We use a
DigitalOcean virtual machine as our compute engine and cloud computing
platform. Currently, Quet is running on a dual-core (1.80 GHz) 64-bit Ubuntu
14.04.4 virtual machine with 2 GB RAM and 20 GB storage capacity. Our
core business logic (including the application server, database services such
as MySQL, MongoDB and Neo4j, Celery tasks, etc.) runs entirely on this
DigitalOcean server.
• Application server:
Quet’s application server is written using Python Flask 0.10.1. Flask is a micro
web framework that is written in Python. Our decision to choose Flask as the
application server was based on numerous advantages offered by the Flask
framework. Flask provides support for RESTful request dispatching and is
completely compliant with WSGI 1.0. Flask supports many other frameworks
for form validation, security, session management, templating, etc. In addition
to these advantages, Flask also has support for SQLAlchemy [41], which is a
robust Object Relational Mapper for Python and MySQL. These advantages
made Flask a clear choice for the application server implementation.
• Handling asynchronous and periodic tasks:
Quet uses Celery 3.1.23 to handle asynchronous tasks and celery beat to han-
dle periodic tasks. Many functionalities within the application should be non-
blocking and handled asynchronously in the background, instead of blocking
the user. Celery provides us with the ability to serve such asynchronous tasks
flexibly and reliably in a distributed manner. In addition to this, Celery also
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provides us with tools to monitor the asynchronous tasks being handled. Task
queues are used to distribute work across threads and Celery worker processes
continuously monitor task queues for tasks to be executed. Celery commu-
nicates via messages using a message broker to mediate between clients and
workers.
Quet uses Celery and celery beat to handle tasks such as retrieving top-rated
mentors, running the matching algorithm periodically according to the match-
ing cycle, sending confirmation emails and other time out notifications to users.
We use RabbitMQ 3.2.4 as the message broker for the Celery workers, since
RabbitMQ is feature complete and robust.
• Workhorse:
We use Python 2.7.6 to implement all of our business logic. The matching
algorithm, various backend request endpoints and Celery tasks are all written
in Python. Python was chosen for its ease of integrating machine learning and
statistical packages, as well as its high compatibility with other packages and
modules, such as those for authentication, templating, routing, etc.
• Data stores used:
We use MySQL 14.14 as the SQL database, MongoDB 3.2.6 as the NoSQL
data store and Neo4j 3.0.1 as the graph DBMS within Quet. MySQL is used
to maintain user credentials for logging in, as well as their GCM [20] token for
sending push notifications. As mentioned previously, we use SQLAlchemy as
the ORM for interacting with MySQL from Python.
MongoDB is used to store user profile information, which includes fields like
their courses, mentor ratings list, mentee ratings list, status, profile picture
(stored as a base64-encoded string), their budget, price, etc. We use PyMongo
3.2.2 [35] as the MongoDB driver from our Python codebase. A MongoDB
collection is also used to queue help-requests submitted by various users for a
given matching cycle. We choose MongoDB as our preferred NoSQL data store
since it is designed for efficient working in applications that are write-heavy.
MongoDB also supports high availability and efficient atomic querying of data.
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Additionally, the schema-less flexibility provided by NoSQL and the ability to
represent data in a JSON-form makes MongoDB a great option. MongoDB
also supports the GeoJSON [19] format and querying based on location-based
data which is useful for matching users based on their GPS locations (to be
incorporated as part of future work).
Neo4j is used to capture interactions between users who have successfully un-
dergone help-request sessions with each other. In other words, the MongoDB
help-requests collection which is periodically dropped as help-requests are con-
sumed in each matching cycle, is translated to a social network in Neo4j. Note
that we use the Neo4j GraphDB to capture only those help-request sessions
which have been completed between 2 users (not cancelled, or declined). We
use py2neo 2.0.8 [34] to interact with our Neo4j graph database from Python.
Figure 3.25 indicates the kind of social network obtained. The nodes of this
graph represent different Quet users who have participated in help-request ses-
sions. This graph has Helped relationships (edges) between each pair of users
who have ever been paired up and completed a help-request session with each
other. For example, a typical Helped relationship between 2 user nodes a and
b would look as follows:
a
HELPED−−−−−−→ b
This edge would represent a help-request session in which user a was matched
as a mentor to user b. The Helped relationship contains many properties to
capture information about the help-request session such as the question asked,
the course, the ratings given by users to each other, the payment involved, etc.
Figure 3.26 shows an example of a typical Helped relationship with its different
property values. By capturing these interactions in the form of a social network
using Neo4j, we are able to run efficient queries that take into account user’s
ego networks. This has also been designed keeping in mind future extensions to
Quet in which user preference lists could be personalized, taking into account
each user’s social network and the peers they interact the most with.
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Figure 3.25: Example of the social network obtained by modeling help-request
sessions between users in Neo4j.
3.5.2 Frontend Components and Other Functionalities
Quet has been designed so that it can be used for any mobile platform. The cur-
rent deployment of the application is for Android, but this can be easily extended
for other mobile platforms. This is achievable through the use of a hybrid mobile
application framework like React Native [40]. In this section, we describe external
software/modules used in Quet to provide extended functionality.
• React Native frontend:
React Native allows us to build native mobile applications using just JavaScript.
The mobile application interface that is developed using React Native is indis-
tinguishable from native mobile applications that would have been built using
Android or Objective-C/Swift (for an iOS app). Furthermore, React Native
is more native than other similar frameworks like Ionic [23], which is based
on Apache Cordova [2]. Though Cordova-based frameworks like Ionic allow
developers to make native API calls, the bulk of the application is HTML and
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Figure 3.26: Example of a Helped relationship wherein user 2 has helped user 1.
JavaScript inside a WebView, thus only being able to approximate the look
and feel of a native application. React Native on the other hand, is completely
integrated with the native mobile OS, making it feel exactly like a native ap-
plication. The added advantage of a native application is performance and
reduced response latency. These factors are extremely important when consid-
ering user experience.
• Push notifications:
We make use of Google Cloud Messaging to handle push notifications and the
in-app chat. GCM is very simple to use, reliable and has support for both
Android as well as iOS. In order to integrate GCM with our application, we
have made use of pushjack 1.2.1 [33]. Pushjack provides support for push
notifications using APNS (Apple Push Notification Service) [3] for iOS, as well
as GCM for Android.
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• User authentication:
Quet authenticates users by sending a confirmation email using Flask-Mail
[16]. Flask-Mail is a Flask extension that provides a simple interface to set
up SMTP with a standalone Flask application. The confirmation email is
send asynchronously using Celery. Token generation is done securely using the
itsdangerous [24] package. User authenticity is checked for all routes requiring
login by validating authorization headers by encoding and decoding JSON Web
Tokens using the jwt [25] package.
• Overall working:
Figure 3.27 goes over the entire system architecture of Quet. The frontend and
backend communicate using REST APIs defined as endpoints in Quet’s Flask
application server.
3.5.3 Design Goals
At a high level, we want our system to cater to the following design goals:
• Low latency and response time:
With huge volumes of data and multiple simultaneous requests, there is not
only a need for constant data availability, but also for minimum data retrieval
delays. Thus, latency has emerged to be one of the most important param-
eters in order to judge the performance of a distributed systems application
like Quet. In applications like Quet which are interactive and involve com-
plex matching algorithms, retrieval of large amounts of data and transferring
large amounts of data over the network, reducing latency is an important re-
quirement. Designing applications that allow faster data retrieval also improve
user experience by reducing the application’s response time. Our design deci-
sions have been made taking these factors into consideration. MongoDB, Neo4j
and their respective interfaces with the underlying Python backend server are
designed for write-heavy applications and provide data at low latency. As men-
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Figure 3.27: Quet’s system architecture diagram.
tioned in the previous section, the use of React Native also reduces application
response time as compared to similar frameworks based on WebViews.
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• Fault tolerance and system availability:
Fault tolerance is a must since we do not want data loss and the system must be
available to serve client requests at all times. We run the matching algorithm
periodically according to the matching cycle. For help-requests to be served
without loss, we must ensure fault tolerance. MongoDB implements replica
sets for fault tolerance and thus is a great choice for achieving this.
• Finding the best possible matches:
By taking into consideration the matching criteria of both, the matched mentor
as well as the mentee, Quet ensures that stable matches can be found. The
matching algorithm preference list generation also indirectly prefers users with
high ratings and also users who are altruistic while offering help. The Gale-
Shapley algorithm used for finding stable matches is very well known and has
been applied in numerous fields for finding stable matches.
• User privacy and security:
The privacy and security of users is of utmost importance in order to main-
tain a strong user-base. Users who wish to use Quet must consent to use the
application first. This requires them to go over a series of consent documents
as explained in section 3.1. Since Quet has been designed to be deployed only
at the UIUC campus (for now), we ensure that users consenting to use the
application are valid UIUC students by sending them a confirmation email on
their Illinois email ID. Furthermore, passwords are stored as an MD5 hash in
the backend and the hashing is done at the client-end to avoid security issues
due to Man-in-the-middle attacks. Each endpoint requiring users to be logged
in, checks for the presence of a valid authorization header to proceed. Further-
more, when a requesting user requests to read or update information about his
or her matched user, the backend ensures that the user has permission to do
this by employing a 2-way check for both users’ status values. Thus, Quet has
been designed to keep in mind user privacy and security.
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• Ensuring data integrity:
Data that is stored in the backend data stores must be consistent and accurate.
Data corruption should be avoided at all costs. MongoDB and Neo4j are con-
sistent by default. MySQL is obviously ACID consistent and thus retrieving
the latest update of data is not an issue. Furthermore, SQL injection-like at-
tacks are impossible due to the use of an ORM and sufficient precautions when
parsing form inputs. Thus, our design choices in Quet ensure data integrity.
• Scalability:
We foresee that the system would have users from various regions of the world.
In order to sustain such a large user base and diverse geographies, the system
should be designed to scale horizontally. With the addition of other frontends
such as web browsers, the need for scalability will grow even further. All design
decisions made while implementing Quet have kept scalability as the top prior-
ity. The DigitalOcean servers used can be scaled easily to provision a larger user
base, increased storage and more compute power. MongoDB is well-suited for
scaling and can provide nearly 100% availability even for millions of operations
per second on nearly 100 billion documents. Neo4j delivers extremely fast read
and write performance, while still protecting data integrity. It combines native
graph storage, scalable architecture optimized for speed, and ACID compliance
to ensure predictability of relationship-based queries. Neo4j has inbuilt query
caching [31] that enables faster response times and efficient retrieval of data. It
is easy to learn and use and can be easily integrated with a wide array of pro-
gramming languages. The Cypher Query Language [10] is very intuitive and
query results are easy to visualize. using the native GUI provided by Neo4j.
Moreover, Neo4j has extensive support for graph based machine learning al-
gorithms such as PageRank, HITS, etc. Using Neo4j to capture interactions
between users can be very useful for future extensions of Quet which make use
of social network analysis and personalized preferences for improving matches.
Celery and RabbitMQ are both designed for distributed asynchronous task
processing and thus will aid in scaling Quet.
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• Power efficiency:
A lot of applications including Quet, run as background processes and share
the same common battery on the mobile phone. Therefore, designing power
efficient applications is an important responsibility. Quet aims at ensuring
power efficiency in spite of having to periodically send user’s notifications. Quet
avoids excess battery consumption by avoiding unnecessary communication
with the server and by replacing polling requests with asynchronous background
Celery tasks which oﬄoad the polling task from the mobile device to the server.
• User experience:
Apart from the above design goals which are important for providing a holistic
user experience, explicit measures must be taken to ensure that the applica-
tion is easy to use, intuitive, abstracts out the underlying complexities and is
aesthetically pleasing. The application should provide for a smooth user ex-
perience and should not crash even on erroneous user inputs. Quet has been
designed keeping in mind simple design principles so that it resembles a native
mobile application as much as possible, in spite of being created using React
Native. Descriptions for various fields are short and easy to understand. But-
tons are not hidden in any way and very easy to find. It is also fairly simple
to navigate between different pages on the application.
• Data visualization:
A picture is worth a thousand words. Data visualization techniques greatly
aid in analyzing trends, patterns and various other characteristics in large
amounts of complex data. Figures 3.25 and 3.26 show us examples of the kind
of visualization possible with Neo4j. Showing an ego network view of this to
users can also be done in order to give them an idea of their interactions as
compared to the interactions of their past matches.
Thus, we can see that Quet has been designed keeping in mind multiple design goals.
All of the components used within Quet have been chosen carefully in order to comply
with these design goals and to aid future extensions to Quet.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this chapter, we describe the proposed experimental setup for evaluating the
usefulness of Quet. We also analyze various performance metrics (like latency, ap-
plication response time, etc.), which affect the ease of use of the application. By
evaluating Quet on these metrics, we are able to gauge how inclined people would
be to use such an application.
4.1 Survey Questions
In this section, we describe the different online survey questions that we had designed
in order to understand how applications like Quet can help students. These questions
have also been aimed at understanding the level to which students currently collab-
orate with their peers. The proposed method of survey evaluation was to divide
the total number of participants equally into a control group that does not use the
application, and a test group that does. In order to remove the effects of selection
bias, we planned to ask a series of online pre-experiment questions to participants
belonging to both groups. It was then planned to allow test group participants to
use Quet for a time period of around 10 days. At the end of this 10-day period,
test group participants would be paid a dollar equivalent of the Quet Credits that
they have earned on the application. After the 10-day period, we had planned on
asking participants belonging to both groups to fill out the same set of online survey
questions. Unfortunately, we were unable to conduct this experiment due to a lack of
participants, but informal feedback from students conveys that Quet could definitely
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be useful. The questions that were designed as part of the pre and post-experimental
online surveys have been listed below.
1. How well do you think you are doing in class?
Options ranged from 1 (Not good) to 5 (Excellent).
2. How many of your peers do you interact with on an average, per
week?
Options were: None, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7+.
3. Getting help from my peers is useful to me.
Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
4. TA office hours or interaction sessions with instructors are frequent
enough to get adequate help with questions I encounter in the course
material.
Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
5. Piazza and other online forums are adequate to receive help with
questions I encounter in the course material. Options were: Strongly
Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
6. I enjoy helping my peers. Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree,
Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
7. I find myself stuck on questions which can be easily resolved by
speaking to peers in my class. Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree,
Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
8. I am comfortable asking questions in front of everyone in class. Op-
tions were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
9. I generally get answers to questions I have in class by:
Options were: Asking the instructor/TA, Asking my peers, Searching over the
internet, Using Piazza/Other applications.
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10. I believe that teaching is the best way to learn something new.
Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
11. I do not mind spending a small amount of money (cost of coffee) to
receive help for questions I encounter in my courses.
Options were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly Agree.
4.2 Performance Metrics
As per our design goals in subsection 3.5.3, latency is one of the most important
performance parameters of today’s interactive applications. Keeping this in mind,
we have thoroughly evaluated various components of our system in terms of latency.
Latency can help us understand application response time for various operations,
through which we can then gauge the ease of using Quet. This becomes increasingly
important when estimating the extent to which Quet will be popular amongst users.
4.2.1 MongoDB Performance Metrics
MongoDB collections are used to store user profile information. We also make use of a
MongoDB collection to temporarily store the help-requests that have been submitted
in a particular matching cycle. Common operations like showing the user his or her
profile, editing the user’s profile, etc. require reads and writes to MongoDB.
4.2.1.1 Read Latency
Showing a user his or her profile information requires the backend to query the
MongoDB profile collection and send this data to the user via a REST response. This
profile information includes the user’s display name, available Quet Credits, profile
picture, courses signed up for, budget, cost and mentor matching criteria. Figure 4.1
shows the CDF of the amount of time required to retrieve a user’s profile information
from the MongoDB profile collection, without taking into account network latency.
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We can see that this read operation is extremely fast and in around 80% of the cases,
this operation only requires around 2.7 milliseconds.
Figure 4.1: Profile load times without taking into account network latency.
Figure 4.2 shows the CDF of the amount of time to retrieve a user’s profile infor-
mation from the MongoDB profile collection and also transfer this to the user via
the network. Note that sending the user’s profile information requires sending his
or her profile picture over a network connection, due to which this is a lot of data.
Even when taking into account network latency, this operation is fast and can be
completed in around 0.21 seconds about 80% of the times.
4.2.1.2 Write Latency
When a user edits his or her profile, an update or write is made in the document
corresponding to that user in the MongoDB profile collection. The user may edit
various aspects of his or her profile including the profile picture, course list, budget,
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Figure 4.2: Profile load times taking into account network latency.
cost and mentor matching criteria. As expected, an edit profile request requiring
the profile picture to be updated is heavier and requires more time than an edit
profile request that only updates the other fields. Figure 4.3 shows us the CDF of
the amount of time required to make a simple edit profile request (without changing
the profile picture), without taking into account network latency. We can see that
this write/update operation is also extremely fast and in around 80% of the cases,
this operation only requires around 2.5 milliseconds.
Figure 4.4 shows the CDF of the amount of time required to make these simple
profile updates, taking into account network latency. We can see that despite network
latency, this write/update operation is still very fast and can be completed in around
0.107 seconds in about 80% of the cases.
If we were also to update the profile picture, this operation becomes heavier as
we can see in figure 4.5. This figure shows us the CDF of the amount of time
required to make an edit profile request which also updates the user’s profile picture,
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Figure 4.3: Simple profile edit times without taking into account network latency.
without taking into account network latency. In spite of the update being heavier,
this operation completes in about 51 milliseconds in about 80% of the cases.
Figure 4.6 shows us the CDF of the amount of time required to make a heavy
(by updating the profile picture as well), edit profile request which also takes into
account the network latency. Note that this request requires sending the updated
profile picture via a REST request to the backend server. We see that this operation
can still be completed in around 153 milliseconds in about 80% of the cases which is
still very fast and does not hinder user experience at all.
4.2.2 Neo4j Performance Metrics
Neo4j is used to maintain a graph database to store help-request session informa-
tion in the form of a social network. Every time a mentor and mentee complete
a help-request session, nodes corresponding to these users are created in the graph
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Figure 4.4: Simple profile edit times taking into account network latency.
database (if not already present) and a directed “Helped” relationship is added from
the mentor node to the mentee node. This “Helped” relationship stores information
pertaining to the help-request like the session number between these 2 users, the
estimated time entered when requesting help, the mentee and mentor matching cri-
teria, the actual question, the course it pertains to, location of the session, payment
amount and the ratings given by each user to the other.
4.2.2.1 Read Latency
Each help-request session between a mentor and a mentee is denoted by a session
number, which conveys the number of times that the mentor has helped this mentee
before. In order to enter the correct session number for the “Helped” relationship
to be added between the mentor and mentee nodes, we must query the Neo4j graph
database for all “Helped” relationships between the particular mentor and mentee.
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Figure 4.5: Heavy profile edit times without taking into account network latency.
Figure 4.7 shows the CDF of the amount of time required for a typical match query to
be run. We can see that in around 80% of the cases, this operation can be completed
in about 60 milliseconds. Also note that the time calculation for this operation takes
into account network latency as well.
4.2.2.2 Write Latency
As mentioned in subsection 4.2.2, we create nodes and relationships for users corre-
sponding to help-request sessions completed between these users. Note that in order
to achieve this, we must first check for the existence of a node corresponding to each
particular user (to avoid duplicate node creation). Thus, this write operation re-
quires us to use the merge operation to ensure that a pattern exists in the graph by
creating it, if it does not exist already. After this step, we then create the “Helped”
relationship between the mentor and mentee nodes. Figure 4.8 shows us the CDF of
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Figure 4.6: Heavy profile edit times taking into account network latency.
the amount of time required to carry out this write operation. We can see that in
80% of the cases, this operation can be completed in about 0.23 seconds. Note that
even for this operation, the time calculation takes into account network latency.
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Figure 4.7: Time taken to run a typical match query in Neo4j to find nodes and a
particular “Helped” session between these nodes.
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Figure 4.8: Time taken to create (if not present) nodes for the mentor and mentee
and then create a “Helped” relationship containing information mentioned in
subsection 4.2.2, amongst these nodes.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we propose a novel application of the sharing economy-based model in
the context of knowledge sharing. We implement this idea in the form of a mobile
application for peer-to-peer help and knowledge sharing, called Quet. Quet uses a
combination of social reputation-based incentives as well as hard incentives (Quet
Credits translated to a dollar equivalent). To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to explore the use of a sharing economy-based model for on-demand tu-
toring. Informal feedback from plausible users indicates that Quet can definitely
help students and help make problem solving efficient and less time-consuming for
them. Chapter 4 also evaluates the ease of use of Quet in terms of low latency and
application response time. Our results from chapter 4 confirm that we have been
able to achieve our design goals mentioned in subsection 3.5.3. When comparing
Quet with other similar applications for finding on-demand tutors, we observe the
following advantages of Quet over these services:
• Other services mostly involve matching students with actual tutors, so there
is no peer-to-peer help. Students and tutors are considered as two mutually
exclusive groups. Quet overcomes this by allowing students to take on the role
of mentors as well as mentees.
• To the best of our knowledge, most of these apps show students all available
tutors and students are responsible for selecting which tutor they wish to be
matched with. Quet oﬄoads this responsibility from the students and does
the matching on its own. Thus, students do not have this extra overhead and
are simply responsible for submitting their help-requests. Quet takes care of
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everything else.
• The costs that students incur when matched with help is much higher in the
case of these other applications. The reason for this is that students are
matched with actual tutors charging around $75 per hour, or so. Quet is
designed for more informal help, which does not necessarily require students
to be matched with a professional tutor. Due to this, the charges for students
are akin to the cost of a cup of coffee, making help much more affordable.
• Competitor applications do not focus on peer-to-peer learning and help. Quet
is more useful for promoting in-class collaboration amongst peers.
• The model of Quet is currently limited to the classroom, however, peer-to-peer
help can be extended to many domains.
5.1 Future Work
Unfortunately, due to lack of participation, we were unable to run the experiment
described in chapter 4. As part of future work, we hope to run this experiment
and evaluate the differences in answers obtained to the online survey questions, to
understand the advantages obtained by the introduction of Quet. The version of
the application that has been currently developed has a basic easy-to-use UI. We
wish to improve the UI to make the application friendlier. Due to issues in iOS
licensing, we have only deployed the Android version of Quet. As part of future
work, we wish to resolve these licensing issues and also develop a version compatible
with iOS devices. Quet has been designed for scalability and the design has been
made keeping in mind the addition of machine learning algorithms and an improved
matching mechanism. We wish to personalize the user preference list generation by
making use of historical data that has been mined from past interactions of users.
Fortunately, due to the use of Neo4j to represent help-request interactions between
users in the form of a social network, this type of social network analysis and machine
learning can be easily integrated without changing the application’s architecture and
93
design. Finally, we wish to deploy Quet at large courses within UIUC and evaluate
the user response. As mentioned earlier, we also wish to extend Quet for on-demand
peer-to-peer knowledge sharing in general, not just limited to the classroom context.
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